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The (Un)Predictable Impact of Technology on
Corporate Governance
Chiara Picciau*
ABSTRACT
This article offers a novel account of the likely impact of new
technologies—such as big data, algorithms, artificial intelligence, the
blockchain, and smart contracts—on corporate governance. It shows that,
contrary to common predictions, one of the most significant and immediate
effects of these technologies on corporations concerns the distribution of
competences and responsibilities among corporate bodies. The claim is
supported by identifying five primary determinants of the current balance of
powers in corporate organizations: (i) the speed and frequency of the
decisions; (ii) the information necessary to decide and who has access to it;
(iii) the costs of assigning decision-making responsibilities to a collegial
body; (iv) the decision-makers’ incentives and interests; and (v) their
competence and skills. Looking at whether and how these five dimensions
are altered by technological innovation is the essential, and yet unexamined,
analytical tool to accurately predict the impact of technology on corporate
governance. While in some cases technological innovations may simply
require managers to possess or acquire new competences and skills or may
strengthen existing corporate roles, providing those who already make
decisions with new tools to operate more efficiently, in other cases
technology may shift the balance on who is the best decision-maker within
the corporation. Technology may reduce some of the transaction costs that
make collective decision-making burdensome for some corporate actors,
suggesting, for example, that decisions that have been traditionally reserved
for the board of directors may be made by shareholders. Similarly,
competences that have commonly been delegated to executive officers and
managers because of the need of particular operating expertise may shift
back to the board of directors due to the informational decision-making
support provided by technological tools. The result may not seem
revolutionary at first glance, but it has potentially disruptive consequences
for existing corporate governance models.

[67]
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between business and technology has historically been
very close. Every major period of economic development in the United
States and abroad has coincided with one or more technological innovations,
each readily embraced by the business community. From ancient times to the
present day, applying these new discoveries to business has made progress
possible. The steam engine, electricity,1 the telephone, the ATM machine,2
and even the filing cabinet3 and the high-rise office block,4 which have
immediate use in management, are famous examples of innovations that are
commonly associated with periods of growth from the first industrial
revolution to the economic boom and financialization of the twentieth
century.
Even though technologically induced socioeconomic changes have
often been profound, there is reason to believe that the technologies of the
twenty-first century will be even more disruptive than those past. The speed
at which change seems to occur is one reason.5 Another is that big data,
* Bocconi University, Milan. I am indebted to Marco Cian and Claudia Sandei, who
gave me the opportunity to present an earlier draft of this article, entitled The (Un)Predictable
Impact of Technology on the Distribution of Corporate Powers and Responsibilities, at the
international seminar “Corporate Strategy and Governance in the Digital Age” held on
November 8, 2019, within the Ph.D. program in Legal Sciences of the University of Milan,
and to the participants in the seminar for valuable inputs. I would also like to thank Luca
Enriques, Mariateresa Maggiolino, Daniel Markovits, and Gabriele Nuzzo for helpful
comments and conversations. All errors remain mine alone.
1. In a recent communication on the development and use of artificial intelligence in
the European Union, the European Commission notably drew a parallel between the impact
of the steam engine and electricity on past socio-industrial development and the possible
effects of artificial intelligence on our society. See Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Artificial Intelligence for Europe, at 1,
COM(2018) 237 final (Apr. 25, 2018).
2. See Douglas W. Arner, Janos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of Fintech:
A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1271, 1274, 1279 (2016) (arguing that the
invention of the ATM machine marks the beginning of modern Fintech).
3. Cf. Shelley Hayduk, From Filing Cabinets to Digital Thought, THE ATLANTIC (Mar.
15, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/03/from-filing-cabinets-todigital-thought/72490/.
4. See generally Gunter Gad & Deryck W. Holdsworth, Corporate Capitalism and the
Emergence of the High-Rise Office Building, 8 URB. GEOGRAPHY 212 (1987) (examining the
connection between the rise of corporate capitalism and the construction of high-rise office
buildings in Toronto).
5. See Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2, passim (emphasizing the speed of
technological development and evolution in the context of FinTech). Note, however, that GDP
growth and total factor productivity in the United States do not seem to support the conclusion
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artificial intelligence, algorithms, blockchains, and smart contracts have farreaching consequences in many fields, including business strategy,6
competition,7 the labor market,8 and even the democratic and political
discourse.9 The Cambridge Analytica scandal, involving the unauthorized
harvesting of personal data of Facebook users,10 showed how big data can be
used to influence public opinion on political matters. Google and Amazon
are modern-day champions of algorithmic profiling, providing personalized
search results and purchase suggestions on the basis of previous online (and,
thanks to the Internet of Things, even offline) customer behavior. Uber has
made its fortune by being the first company in the transportation industry
with no transportation means and, at least according to its management, no
employees.11 Even more traditional manufacturing companies, such as
BMW, are now trying to integrate big data and artificial intelligence into
their business models.12
From a corporate law perspective, a third and perhaps more compelling
reason to consider twenty-first-century technologies disruptive is that they
that the speed of innovation is currently at a historical high, although it might increase in the
future. See VIJAY KUMAR & R.P. SUNDARRAJ, GLOBAL INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC VALUE
84–88 (2018); MICHAEL GREENSTONE & ADAM LOONEY, A DOZEN ECONOMIC FACTS ABOUT
INNOVATION 10 (2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/08_innova
tion_greenstone_looney.pdf. See also Brishen Rogers, The Law & Political Economy of
Workplace Technological Change, 55 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 531, 554–55
(2020) (observing that current productivity statistics do not suggest high rates of automation).
6. See Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans & Avi Goldfarb, Artificial Intelligence in the
Boardroom, 39 CORP. BOARD 16, 17–18 (2018).
7. See, e.g., MARIATERESA MAGGIOLINO, I BIG DATA E IL DIRITTO ANTITRUST (2018).
8. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and
Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 257–58, 263–301 (2018); Rogers, supra note 5, at
553–73.
9. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THEY DON’T REPRESENT US: RECLAIMING OUR DEMOCRACY
67–136 (2019).
10. See Issie Lapowski, How Cambridge Analytica Sparked the Great Privacy
Awakening, WIRED (Mar. 17, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/cambridgeanalytica-facebook-privacy-awakening/; Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and
Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html. In the legal
scholarship, see, e.g., Paul Przemysław Polański, Some thoughts on data portability in the
aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, 7 J. EUR. CONSUMER & MKT. L. 141 (2018);
Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Designing for Consent, 7 J. EUR. CONSUMER & MKT. L. 162, 163 (2018).
11. On Uber’s fissured workplace environment, see, e.g., Estlund, supra note 8, at 257,
284–85; Rogers, supra note 5, at 571.
12. Bernard Marr, How BMW Uses Artificial Intelligence And Big Data To Design And
Build Cars Of Tomorrow, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2017, 12:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bernardmarr/2017/08/01/how-bmw-uses-artificial-intelligence-and-big-data-to-design-andbuild-cars-of-tomorrow/#5520d0eb2b91.
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seem to support the long-awaited modernization of corporate organizations
and to profoundly change firms’ inner workings. Over time, corporations
have remained almost intact in their distinguishing features,13 which entail a
body of investor-owners delegating management to one or more people
sitting on a board.14 While mutual funds and other institutional investors
helped introduce some changes in corporate governance, agency problems
remain a well-known consequence of delegated management15 despite
technological advances.16 Even the Internet—which made distance
irrelevant, communications easy, and information widely accessible—did
not bring about serious transformation. Even today, virtual shareholder
meetings remain a distant possibility in many jurisdictions,17 while proxy
and direct voting continue to present practical challenges, including ensuring
proper shareholder identification and vote recording.18 Significantly,
information readily available on the Internet has not even fully substituted
paper documents and regular mail in corporate communications yet.19
According to many commentators, this might soon change. Blockchain could
revolutionize the way securities transactions are cleared and registered,
ensuring specific shareholder identification as well as more transparency for
corporate records and even virtual shareholder meetings.20 Artificial

13.

See generally John Armour et al., What Is Corporate Law?, in REINIER KRAAKMAN
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1–
15 (3d ed. 2017) (identifying the common legal features of corporations across different
jurisdictions).
14. Id. at 11–13.
15. Michael J. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976).
16. Cf. Luca Enriques & Dirk A. Zetzsche, Corporate Technologies and the Tech
Nirvana Fallacy, HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript available as European Corporate
Governance Institute (ECGI) Law Working Paper No. 457/2019, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3392321 (questioning, at 4, 7, whether algorithms and
machines can improve monitoring on corporate agents). Cf. also Sergio Alberto Gramitto
Ricci, Artificial Agents in Corporate Boardrooms, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 869, 877, 906
(2020).
17. See Christoph Van der Elst & Anne Lafarre, Blockchain and the 21st Century Annual
General Meeting, 14 EUR. COMPANY L. 167, 174 (2017) (observing that most E.U. members
states do not allow virtual shareholder meetings); Dirk Zetzsche, Corporate Governance in
Cyberspace—A Blueprint for Virtual Shareholder Meetings 27–28 (Heinrich Heine
University Düsseldorf, Center for Business and Corporate Law Research Paper Series (CBCRPS) No. 0011, 2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=747347.
18. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate
Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227 (2008); Christoph Van der Elst & Anne Lafarre, Blockchain and
Smart Contracting for the Shareholder Community, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 111 (2019).
19. Cf. Zetzsche, supra note 17, at 16–21.
20. See infra Part I.D.
ET AL.,
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intelligence could transform the way directors and officers make decisions
in many different ways, from providing informational support to actually
substituting them in whole or in part.21 More generally, common predictions
for technology’s impact on corporations vary from forecasts of completely
autonomous organizations, run entirely by algorithms,22 to more limited
improvements and efficiencies in the workings of corporate bodies and
procedures. But why should the new technologies bring about more dramatic
changes than the technologies of the past? How realistic are these
predictions? And what transformations can we actually expect in corporate
governance?
This article addresses these questions. It argues that, while the answer
depends at least to some extent on the chosen time frame and on the specific
technology considered, one of the most significant and immediate effects of
the new technologies on corporations will concern the distribution of powers
and responsibilities among corporate bodies.23
The current distribution of powers is well known and fairly similar
across jurisdictions. Shareholders vote on control-related and structural
decisions, such as appointing and removing the company’s directors and
approving mergers and liquidations. Directors, in turn, are responsible for
making business decisions, such as whether to launch a new product or
dismiss a supplier, but typically delegate day-to-day management to
company executives and officers and retain policy-making and monitoring
functions.
Unlike past technological innovations, twenty-first century
technologies have the potential to alter this balance. Particularly if used in
conjunction with one another, they may decisively affect the determinants
along which corporate law traditionally assigns power to various corporate
constituencies.
The article identifies five primary determinants of the current balance
of powers in corporate organizations that concern which decisions must be
made and how they should be settled. These determinants are (i) the speed
and frequency of the decisions; (ii) the information necessary to decide (and
who has access to it); (iii) the costs of assigning decision-making
responsibilities to a collegial body; (iv) the decision-makers’ incentives and
21. See, e.g., Florian Möslein, Robots in the boardroom: artificial intelligence and
corporate law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 649, 657–
66 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2019).
22. See infra Part I.E.
23. See David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 REV. FIN. 7, 9
(2017) (observing that the changes made possible by blockchains “could dramatically affect
the balance of power between directors, managers and shareholders.”).
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interests; and (v) their competence and skills. Looking at whether and how
these five dimensions are altered by technological innovation is the essential,
and yet unexamined, analytical tool to reliably and accurately predict the
impact of technology on corporate governance. The main contribution of this
article is, thus, to use these five factors to explain why and to what extent
twenty-first century technologies may disrupt corporate organizations and
governance.
New technologies may, for instance, significantly reduce the
transaction costs that make collective decision-making burdensome for some
corporate actors, such as the shareholders, suggesting that decisions that
have traditionally been reserved for the board of directors may instead be
made by the shareholder meeting, in whole or in part. Similarly,
responsibilities that have commonly been delegated to executive officers and
managers because of their particular operating expertise may shift back to
the board of directors due to the informational decision-making support
provided by technological tools. Modern technologies may even change the
ratio of company executives to non-executive employees, allowing the first
to control and manage a higher number of production workers with fewer—
or possibly without any—middle managers, leading to significant changes in
corporations’ organizational charts. More fundamentally, new technologies
may strengthen existing corporate roles, providing those who already make
decisions with new tools to operate more efficiently or, conversely, shift the
balance on who is, in certain respects, the best decision-maker within the
corporation. The result may not seem revolutionary at first glance, but it
foreshadows potentially disruptive consequences for existing corporate
governance models and demands renewed attention to ad hoc contractual
solutions aimed at redesigning the roles of shareholders, directors, and
managers on a case-by-case basis.
Examining how technology alters the five dimensions listed above also
enables us to appreciate the limits and constraints of technologically induced
organizational change. For example, modern technologies do not provide
competence and skills to those who do not have them; this remains a
powerful theoretical limit to the scope of any conceivable reshuffle of
corporate roles and functions.
In this respect, the article builds on and implicitly supports one of the
most basic claims of principal-cost theory24—namely, that competence
considerations and costs play a fundamental role in determining a firm’s
optimal governance structure. Principal-cost theory teaches that optimal
24. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate
Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767 (2017).
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governance requires minimizing both principal and agent costs, which are
the economic losses that either the principal or the agent produce when
exercising control. These significantly include, among others, the cost of
honest mistakes made by the principal due to lack of competence, expertise,
information, or talent (the so-called “principal competence costs”); this is the
main reason that most enterprises delegate tasks to management in the first
place.25 Unless the principal has the necessary competence to run the
business, it is “cheaper” to devolve it to management than to retain it.26
Technology enthusiasts often claim that technological innovations such
as blockchains and smart contracts will enable shareholders to assume direct
control of the firm and will downsize or eliminate the need for directors and
managers altogether. This article shows, however, that technology does very
little, if anything, to reduce principal competence costs; this is why we
should not expect radical changes in the current distribution of powers and
responsibilities among corporate bodies, at least in the short term and with
respect to most firms. While technology might strengthen the decisionmaking and monitoring role of the shareholders vis-à-vis corporate directors
and managers, competence acts as a fundamental limit to the extent to which
shareholder empowerment in these two areas can take place. The article also
demonstrates that competence and skill will continue to significantly
characterize the role of corporate directors and managers even in the new
technological era. Technology opens up opportunities and creates risks.
Directors and managers will need to acquire new skills in order to exploit the
former and understand and mitigate the latter. The creation of ad hoc internal
tech departments and committees in charge of identifying and managing the
unfolding possibilities and challenges of technological innovation will most
likely follow suit. The overall result might be a stronger strategic and
business role for corporate directors—that is, greater empowerment for those
corporate constituencies who have, or could more easily acquire, the
necessary competence to manage the business.
As a final methodological note, in discussing the impact of technology
on the five factors listed above, the article focuses on the relationship
between shareholders, directors, and managers and does not address whether
directors and managers should in their business choices also account for the
interests of a broader spectrum of corporate stakeholders.27 The adoption of
25. The other reason is to reduce principal conflicts costs. See id. at 791–93, 802.
26. Id. at 770 (observing that “[t]o avoid such costs, [shareholders] delegate control to
managers whom they expect will run the firm more competently”).
27. The origins of the discussion can be traced back to the beginning of the 1930s.
Compare Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931) (arguing that corporate managers should put the interests of shareholders first), with

4 - PICCIAU_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

74

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

12/2/2020 1:00 PM

[Vol. 17:1

a stakeholder theory of corporate governance or of other approaches namely,
the team production theory of corporate law and the director primacy view28
could in fact implicitly set a constraint on the shift in power that could or
should be achieved through technological innovation, favoring in any case
greater managerial discretion.29 It remains true, however, that technology
may also help empower (or disempower) different stakeholders, including
customers, employees, suppliers, and local communities, in their interactions
with the company.30
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145
(1932) (contending that corporate managers should also consider the interests of other
stakeholders). The dominant view has generally supported the shareholder primacy norm.
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 440–42 (2001). New interest in this debate resulted, however, from the increasing
attention paid by institutional investors to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues
and from a recent statement of the Business Roundtable which, contrary to previous policy
positions, supported a broader conception of the corporate purpose that considers the needs
of all stakeholders. Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (Aug.
19, 2019) https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/BRT-Sta
tement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-with-Signatures.pdf. On the reasons for such a
change of heart by the Business Roundtable, see Mark J. Roe, Why Are America’s CEOs
Talking About Stakeholder Capitalism Now?, OXFORD BUSINESS LAW BLOG (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2019/11/why-are-americas-ceos-talking-a
bout-stakeholder-capitalism-now.
28. For a recent account of these different corporate governance models, see Ronald J.
Gilson, From Corporate Law to Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 3, 15–22 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds.,
2018).
29. Unless one agrees with the claim that shareholders, and especially institutional
investors, have an interest in environmental and social issues and should thus be the main
advocates for stakeholder concerns. Cf. Marco Maugeri, «Pluralismo» e «monismo» nello
scopo della s.p.a. (glosse a margine del dialogo a più voci sullo Statement della Business
Roundtable), 2019 ORIZZONTI DEL DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 637. Cf. also Chiara Mosca &
Chiara Picciau, Making Non-Financial Information Count: Accountability and Materiality in
Sustainability Reporting, in FINANCE DURABLE ET DROIT: PERSPECTIVES COMPARÉES 175,
181, 184–86 (Hugues Bouthinon-Dumas, Bénédicte François & Anne-Catherine Muller eds.,
2020) (arguing that the European lawmaker has tried to make institutional investors more
attentive to sustainability and ESG matters). From this perspective, shareholder empowerment
could also serve to protect stakeholder concerns, and the reasoning of this article, which
focuses on the relationship between shareholders and managers, would not be significantly
affected.
30. Blockchains could, for instance, increase transparency toward different stakeholder
groups, and smart contracts could help administer contractual relationships between some
stakeholders and the firm. On blockchains and smart contracts, see infra Parts I.C and I.D.
More generally, platform-style businesses already encourage collaboration among different
stakeholder groups. See Mark Fenwick, Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The
End of ‘Corporate’ Governance: Hello ‘Platform’ Governance, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV.
171, 172–73, 176, 193–94 (2019).
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Against this background, the article proceeds as follows. Part I offers a
brief overview of the technological tools and innovations that might affect
twenty-first century corporations, such as big data, algorithms, artificial
intelligence, blockchains, and smart contracts. Part II discusses the
traditional distribution of powers and responsibilities among corporate
bodies, identifying five criteria that help explain which corporate
constituency—whether the shareholders, the board of directors, or the
company executives—should make which decisions in the corporation’s
organizational structure and why. Arguably, factors such as the costs of
collective decision-making or the decision-maker’s incentives and skills help
identify who should be in charge of a given decision, as well as the optimal
allocation of responsibilities among corporate roles. Part III examines how
new technologies may alter this balance—they have the potential to
strengthen the deliberative role of the shareholder meeting by reducing the
costs of collegial decision-making and enabling more efficient voting
procedures. With the assistance of technological tools, the role of the board
of directors might also change in fundamental respects, undertaking new
responsibilities and benefiting from modern decision-making aids. Part IV
develops three main policy recommendations that respond to the expected
impact of technology on corporate roles and powers and argues that
corporate law’s enabling nature must be preserved and strengthened to
facilitate innovation. Part V summarizes the results of the analysis and
concludes the article.
I. TECHNOLOGY IN CORPORATE ORGANIZATIONS:
FROM DIGITALIZATION TO AUTOMATION
Even after the Internet connected the world, bridging distances for
people and businesses, corporate roles remained almost unchanged.
Shareholder meetings have continued to occur once a year. Their task still is
to elect the company’s directors and to approve mergers, acquisitions, and
other fundamental transactions (and, in certain jurisdictions, to vote on
financial statements and the distribution of dividends). Even though the
Internet made it easier to share information and communicate over long
distances, shareholders of public corporations haven’t begun to meet more
frequently or become more involved in corporate affairs. Despite being
technically feasible, virtual shareholder meetings are rare.31 Electronic
31. Marie Clara Buellingen, Virtual Shareholder Meetings in the U.S., HARV. L. SCH. F.
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 10, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/10/virtual-sha
reholder-meetings-in-the-u-s/ (noting that “physical shareholder meetings remain, by far, the
most common approach for U.S. companies”).
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voting, either by proxy or directly, is common, but it usually continues to be
connected with a physical assembly32 whose attendance rates remain low.
What changed the most is probably the way corporations disseminate
information to the market, both in preparation for the annual general meeting
and during the financial year. Information is now readily available on
company websites and on publicly accessible databases (such as EDGAR),33
with the consequence that, at least for public corporations, shareholders have
easy access to all relevant documents. Digital means have, however, not
entirely substituted paper-based correspondence, and lawmakers have not
truly encouraged the precise replication of shareholder meetings on virtual
platforms,34 with some recent noteworthy exceptions due to the COVID-19
pandemic.35
The same is true with respect to the role of directors and managers.
While internal communications and auditing systems have increasingly gone
digital, core supervisory and managerial functions have been preserved. The
board of directors maintains a monitoring and policy-making role vis-à-vis
company executives, who are instead in charge of managing the day-to-day
business. Although remote participation in board meetings has entered the
routine, these gatherings continue to be held physically in many cases.
Importantly, face-to-face meetings and phone conversations are still a very
frequent form of private engagement between the company and its
institutional investors or control shareholders, despite the increased
availability of digital tools.36
32. With respect to Europe, see Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 18, at 121–23.
33. About EDGAR, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm (last visited Apr. 5,
2020).
34. See Zetsche, supra note 17, at 13–28, 61.
35. For example, New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo recently issued an executive
order temporarily suspending subsection (a) of Section 602 and subsections (a) and (b) of
Section 605 of New York’s Business Corporation Law, which require shareholder meetings
to be held and noticed at a physical location, thus enabling New York companies to hold
virtual shareholder meetings. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.8 (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.
governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_202.8.pdf. In the international
landscape, Italy provides another interesting illustration of the recent greater openness of
lawmakers to virtual shareholder meetings. See Decreto Legge 17 marzo 2020, n. 18, G.U.
Mar. 17, 2020, n. 70, art. 106.
36. See, e.g., MARC GOLDSTEIN, DEFINING ENGAGEMENT: AN UPDATE ON THE EVOLVING
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHAREHOLDERS, DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES. A STUDY CONDUCTED
BY INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES FOR THE INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH
CENTER INSTITUTE 13–15 (2014), https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/IIRCiResearchDocume
nts/2015/09/engagement-between-corporations-and-investors-at-all-time-high1.pdf; Matteo
Tonello & Matteo Gatti, Board-Shareholder Engagement Practices. Findings from a Survey
of SEC-Registered Companies 14–15 (Dec. 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3503657; Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 18, at 124–25.
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The impact of twentieth century technologies on corporations has thus
involved a substantial, but not yet fully developed, digitalization of
procedures and communications, which did not affect the role and
responsibilities of the corporation’s constituent bodies. Shareholders,
directors, and managers continue to do what they have always done, with the
help of faster connections and more accessible information.
The reason for this, even intuitively, is that twentieth-century
technologies simply provided more efficient ways of doing the same things,
without reducing directors’ dependence on managerial input and information
or enabling effective shareholder empowerment. For example, they have not
eliminated information asymmetries. Corporate management retained the
power to decide what to disclose, to whom and when, although it could do
so through faster and more efficient communication means. Similarly,
twentieth-century technologies facilitated virtual shareholder meetings and
greater shareholder participation, but they have not quite ensured tamperproof voting procedures, and have only marginally reduced collective
decision-making costs. Shareholder identification, coordination, and voting
remain troublesome, and information gathering and processing are still a
costly endeavor for many investors.
This article argues that the same is not true for certain recent
technological innovations, which, despite being often analyzed and
examined separately,37 build on one another in reshaping the role and
functions of the corporation’s governing bodies. Recent research has
typically addressed either how big data, algorithms and artificial intelligence
may affect managerial decisions or, alternately, how blockchains and smart
contracts may be employed to make shareholder meetings more efficient.
Clearly, since artificial intelligence and algorithms, frequently working on
big data, are decision-making tools, their most immediate application
concerns those corporate constituencies—directors, officers, and
managers—who usually make decisions. Similarly, since blockchains are
distributed ledgers upon which computer programs may execute transactions
(so-called “smart contracts”),38 their most immediate use concerns
shareholder identification at corporate meetings, the recording of share
transfers, and the administration of voting procedures. However, looking at
the impact of each new technological tool in isolation risks missing the big

37. For a significant exception in the legal scholarship, see Enriques & Zetzsche, supra
note 16.
38. See infra Part I.C.
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picture, as these technologies interact with one another and compound each
other,39 potentially reshaping existing corporate roles and functions.
Before delving deeper into the factors that should be employed to
determine who should be in charge of a given decision within the corporation
and how new technologies might affect this delicate balance, this Part
describes the main technological innovations of the last decades in order to
shed light on the unique features that make them suitable for application in
business organization and governance.
A. Big Data Analytics and the Platform Economy
The expression “big data” refers to large databases of (unsorted) data,
collected through technological and digital means, that are generally deemed
valuable because of the knowledge that can be extracted from them.40 Big
data vary in content, depending on how they were compiled, who controls
the database, and why they were collected. They may, for example, include
consumer browsing or shopping behavior on e-commerce websites acquired
through Internet cookies, search histories, and other digital tools. They may
comprise data on road traffic or driving habits, obtained through satellites,
cameras, and car sensors. They may even encompass astronomical data,
human genome data, or financial data.41 Classifications based on the content
of the collected information are thus not particularly instructive or useful.
The common element is that the data are obtained, stored, and analyzed,
often at significant speed, through technological means and that they enable
their user to obtain valuable knowledge.
Interestingly, the knowledge that can be extracted from big data is not
necessarily immediately obvious.42 Take the classical example of an ecommerce website that records consumer searches and shopping choices.
The data may reveal that a specific consumer prefers to read non-fiction or
to wear silk blouses. It might also reveal other personal information that the
consumer did not openly share, such as her age or income range, her political
views, when she does most of her shopping (and presumably is not at work),
and so on. Data analysis of online grocery shopping may allow one to infer,
39. See Mark Fenwick & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Technology and Corporate Governance.
Blockchain, Crypto and Artificial Intelligence, 48 TEX. J. BUS. L. 1, 3–4 (2019).
40. See MAGGIOLINO, supra note 7, at 21, 28–31. See also JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN
TRUTH AND POWER. THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 48–74
(2019) (arguing that personal data are playing the role of raw materials in the information
economy, constituting a new public domain: the “biopolitical public domain”).
41. MAGGIOLINO, supra note 7, at 30.
42. See id.
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from the goods the consumer buys or does not buy anymore, whether she
lives alone, is pregnant, is on a diet, has a health condition, might soon suffer
from one, is assisting an elderly parent, and so forth. This enables companies
to target marketing campaigns, offer personalized shopping suggestions, and
adjust search results on the basis of what they expect the consumer will want
to purchase in the future. In other words, big data enable businesses to create
rather accurate consumer profiles and to reasonably predict consumer
behavior. These predictions are, in turn, valuable for two reasons. They can
be directly employed to offer customized services that are likely to be
successful or they can be sold to third parties, allowing them to extract
different, equally valuable knowledge from the same dataset.43
Although big data are also gathered by public bodies, governmental
agencies, and other entities for many different purposes, they are generally
associated with Internet platforms such as Facebook or Amazon.44 Platforms
are in a unique position to collect and exploit large amounts of data because
users interact with them in a variety of ways. The more frequent and diverse
these interactions are, the more opportunities the platform has to collect data.
Facebook, for instance, has access to users’ personal information, “likes,”
comments, posts, search histories, and much more. Amazon, Google, Uber,
and other platform providers work in much the same way. They connect
individuals and businesses, mediating communications and exchanges.45 In
the process, they collect information on what these people say or do on the
platform. As a result, although originally the term platform merely identified
the technical base upon which computer programs ran,46 today platforms are
complex infrastructures, built around networks47 that enable the collection
and exploitation of what has been termed the “fourth factor of production”:
“the data flows extracted from people.”48

43. See id. at 186–88 (describing data marketplaces). See also COHEN, supra note 40, at
68–70.
44. See, e.g., Fenwick, McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 174–78, 187–97
(describing platforms, their business models, and what governance models based on a
platform structure could look like).
45. See Mireille Hildebrandt, Primitives of Legal Protection in the Era of Data-Driven
Platforms, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 252, 254–55 (2018) (drawing parallels between modern-day
platforms, the Greek agora, and the Roman forum as spaces for market exchanges, political
discourse, and other forms of expression).
46. Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of ‘Platforms’, 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 347, 351
(2010); also cited by Hildebrandt, supra note 45, at 254.
47. Cf. COHEN, supra note 40, at 40–42 (on the difference between platforms and
networks).
48. Id. at 38, 41.
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The close link between big data and platforms is at the foundation of
the so-called “platform economy” or “informational economy.”49 The model
is fairly simple. Most of what happens on the Internet happens through
platforms: communications, finance, transactions in goods and services,
entertainment, social contacts, even employment.50 Platforms mediate and
facilitate these relationships and interactions. In doing so, they have unique
access to a pool of comprehensive and diverse data on each participant in the
network that extends beyond the specific transaction or communication
considered. In this respect, online environments and real-life situations have
a major difference. A shopkeeper will, for example, focus on what customers
like and buy, not so much on other details, such as at what time of the day a
particular customer shops, how much time she spends in the shop, whether
she is talking to someone while shopping, how often she shops, and so forth.
In contrast, everything that we do on the Internet is tracked, recorded, and
“surveilled,”51 representing potentially valuable information. The more
activities we undertake in an online environment, the more information the
owner of the platform can collect on our behavior. This is a powerful
function: a platform can observe our online behavior in its entirety, measure
all its relevant aspects, and then analyze the data to obtain valuable
knowledge.
The goal is to provide a stable point of mediation for the largest possible
number of users, in order to have access to increasing amounts of analyzable
data and eventually to substitute entire markets.52 One way through which
this happens is by exploiting the data themselves to make users and
customers rely on the platform. Social networks, for instance, often “test”
user reactions by providing triggers and rewards that aim to induce recurrent
behaviors. Big data and artificial intelligence are employed to find out what
users like. This in turn is exploited to make the online experience more
addictive, in a complex trigger-and-reward system that may even be used to
affect user behavior.53 This mechanism has gained attention, especially in
connection to its possible influence on elections and political discourse.54
However, it also has important implications for the development of new

49. See id. passim (defining platforms as “the core organizational logic of the
informational economy”).
50. See id. at 37.
51. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE
FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2018).
52. COHEN, supra note 40, at 42. Cf. Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 86–90 (2015) (describing Uber’s market-making function).
53. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 9, at 114–17, 122–23, 125, 192.
54. See id. at 119–22.
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products, services, and markets more generally. Customer loyalty is, in fact,
essentially obtained through network externalities and personalized services.
B. Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence, and Machine Learning
What spurred the rise of platforms and their business models?
Widespread access to the Internet provides one piece of the puzzle, while
improvements in hardware and software, which made it possible for
computers to store and process large amounts of data, largely account for the
remaining elements.55 However, the fundamental factors undoubtedly were
the development of proprietary algorithms56 and artificial intelligence.57
Platforms make considerable use of both in order to offer personalized
services.
In very broad terms, artificial intelligence is the ability of computers
and other machines to behave in a way that appears “smart” or “intelligent”
to an external observer.58 The technologies that enable this are different and
many.59 Famous examples are decision-making programs that employ
(proprietary) algorithms and machine learning.60
Algorithms provide the technical tool to extract knowledge from a
database. Although they are frequently used in connection with (large)
55. See Fenwick, McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 187 (identifying
improvements in hardware, connectivity, cloud-based storage systems for big data, and
algorithms as the drivers of platform expansion). See generally ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE
LEARNING: THE NEW AI 1–7 (2016) (discussing computers’ increased ability to store and
exchange data).
56. Cf. COHEN, supra note 40, at 45–46 (describing how platforms enable commercial
counterparties, such as app developers and advertisers, to interact with potential customers
without granting them access to the platform’s databases and algorithms).
57. See John Armour & Horst Eindenmüller, Self-Driving Corporations?, 10 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 87, 92–95 (2020) (on the origins and present state of artificial intelligence).
58. See id. at 92 (pointing out that the understanding of artificial intelligence as a
machine that appears smart and intelligent, using as a basis for comparison the human
intellect, has its origins in the work of Alan M. Turing. A machine passes the so-called
“Turing test” if an interrogator, questioning a human and the machine without knowing who
is what, would not be able to determine whether she is talking to a machine or a human based
on their answers) (quoting from Alan M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59
MIND 433 (1950)).
59. See Möslein, supra note 21, at 655–56.
60. See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 90 (2014)
(noting that the results of machine learning algorithms may appear “intelligent”). See
generally Bernard Marr, What Is The Difference Between Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning?, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2016, 2:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/
2016/12/06/what-is-the-difference-between-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning
(distinguishing artificial intelligence from machine learning).
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datasets, algorithms are, in a strict sense, instructions that a computer uses to
perform a task.61 Software programmers may explicitly formulate those
instructions—for example, through coding. In these instances, human
programmers tell the software what to do and how to do it, by spelling out in
programming languages what inputs to use and how to process them.
Machine learning represents a more sophisticated use of algorithms. In
this case, the computer program is not given instructions on how to perform
a task, but it is programmed to elaborate its own instructions by a complex
trial-and-error procedure based on data.62 The data might be, as is often the
case, “big data,” but this is not strictly necessary. Machine learning is in fact
any learning activity autonomously performed by a computer program on a
given set of data.63 The most successful machine learning programs so far
are supervised learning programs64 that make use of deep learning
techniques: a setup in which the data are analyzed in series through a process
of abstraction and recalibration that should ideally resemble the thought
process of the human brain.65 These programs are trained on a labeled dataset
put together by flesh-and-blood programmers. On the training dataset, the
computer identifies hidden patterns, rules, and consistencies that it later uses
to create new instructions to perform on a new and unknown dataset the same
task that was successfully executed on the training data. For example,
programmers may train computers to provide translation services.66 In order
to do so, they put together a training dataset that may include words and
sentences in one language and their translations in another language. The
programmers, however, do not give the program any grammar or syntax rule
61. ALPAYDIN, supra note 55, at 16.
62. See, e.g., id. at 16–17, 24–26; David H. Autor, Polanyi’s Paradox and the Shape of
Employment Growth, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY: ECONOMIC POLICY
SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS. REEVALUATING LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS 129, 158–62 (2015)
(providing examples of how machine learning systems are programmed and work); Surden,
supra note 60, at 90–95 (describing the main features of machine learning algorithms and
providing an example of how they can automate spam email filtering).
63. See generally ALPAYDIN, supra note 55, at 17–54 (providing background information
on what learning entails and how artificial intelligence makes use of statistics to “learn” and
make predictions).
64. Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 95 (also pointing out that supervised
learning programs are different from unsupervised and reinforcement learning systems.
Unsupervised learning does not make use of labeled training datasets, while reinforcement
learning only works by providing the system with a reward for identifying the correct answer.
These two techniques have had some success, but far more limited applications.).
65. Id. at 93–95. See generally ALPAYDIN, supra note 55, at 85–109 (explaining how
artificial neural networks and deep learning work).
66. Surden, supra note 60, at 99–100 (describing how machine learning tools for
translation services work).
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that the software should follow in delivering the translation.67 They simply
evaluate the outcome. By telling the program whether the outcome of the
translation was right or wrong, the program adjusts for future applications.
In this sense, the machine autonomously “learns” which patterns and rules
are hidden in the data and performs the task based on those consistencies.
Curiously, while the rules that artificial intelligence programs might identify
in a given dataset may not correspond to actual rules, the outcome is often
still fairly correct.
In the case of a translation, understanding what hidden patterns and
rules the machine found is not of utmost importance, provided that, at least
intuitively or implicitly, we know how different languages work and simply
wish a computer program to replicate, as close as possible, what any human
translator already does well. The ability to find hidden patterns, rules, and
consistencies becomes, however, very important when we do not know what
they are and how they work, but simply know they exist.68 It is precisely in
this respect that machine learning, in conjunction with big data, offers the
greatest innovation. Machine learning can be employed not only to replicate
tasks that humans do well, but also to perform tasks that humans are not able
to do accurately or at all because of their limited computing abilities or their
insufficient understanding of the underlying processes and rules. A human
observer may, for example, anticipate, based on experience, what another
person would say or do in a certain situation but might not be able to
accurately extend the prediction to other people or all situations. This is
because there is a limit to the data and information that humans can acquire,
store, and analyze at once. Moreover, while we have some knowledge of
cognitive processes and biases, our understanding of human behavior is, in
general, still flawed. This means that no programmer could teach a machine
to read, interpret, and anticipate human behavior. It does not mean, however,
that a machine could not learn to do this by itself, and the outcome won’t
67. This approach was actually tried by encoding grammatical rules in computer
programs tasked to recognize and translate language, but the programs failed. Machine
learning algorithms have instead provided much better results. Id. See generally Armour &
Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 93 (observing that in the first stage of developing artificial
intelligence, programmers attempted to feed programs with formal logic rules. This approach
did not succeed due to the complexity of real-world problems and the difficulties in the
deterministic calculation of all their possible outcomes).
68. See ALPAYDIN, supra note 55, at 14 (defining consumer “data mining” as a type of
machine learning for which “[w]e do not know the rules (of customer behavior), so we cannot
write the program, but the machine—that is, the computer—”learns” by extracting such rules
from (customer transaction) data.”); Surden, supra note 60, at 107 (observing that machine
learning can be used to discover “hidden relationships in existing data that may otherwise be
difficult to detect.”).
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necessarily be less accurate than when a real person performs such a
calculation. Machines have greater storage and computing abilities, which
enable them to “outsmart” their flesh-and-blood counterparts in situations
where the underlying knowledge is murky, the data necessary to perform the
task are vast, and speed of computing is key. By making use of these
enhanced capabilities and working on large datasets, artificial intelligence
improves our knowledge of the world, suggesting what hidden patterns and
consistencies may hide behind an observed result.
Importantly, the algorithms autonomously elaborated by machine
learning software on the basis of data need not be—and often are not—fully
understandable or transparent to human programmers to be of valuable
commercial use.69 Only the result of the predictive or analytic activity must
be. Thus, although machine learning is useful mostly in connection with
tasks for which we know that there are hidden patterns or rules, it will not
necessarily shed light on what these are and how they work. As a matter of
fact, the rules that artificial intelligence programs identify in a given dataset
not only may not correspond to actual rules, but they may never become fully
distinguishable or comprehensible—yet artificial intelligence can still
deliver accurate predictions.
An example may help clarify the concept. Suppose that a restaurant
chain wishes to know which dishes and drinks its customers are likely to
order more often than not so as to revise its menu.70 The managers know that
customer preferences change over time and depending on the location, but
they do not know exactly what these preferences are. Indeed, while a single
restaurant might be able to make rather accurate predictions, considering its
limited customer base and particular location, a restaurant chain might
encounter more difficulties. The task is, however, not hopeless, because
“customer behavior is not completely random.”71 One might expect, for
instance, that customers order more soup in the winter and more sorbets in
the summer or that their drinking choices vary depending on the time of the
year. There are, in other words,
patterns in customer behavior, and this is where data comes in
to play. Though we do not know the customer behavior patterns
themselves, we expect to see them occurring in the collected data. If

69.
70.

See Rogers, supra note 5, at 558.
The example in the text adapts the example of the supermarket chain provided in
ALPAYDIN, supra note 55, at 11–13.
71. Id. at 13.
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we can find such patterns … we can make predictions based on
them.72
Better predictions enable, in turn, better business choices, increasing
the profitability of those upholding them. Artificial intelligence helps
precisely in making these predictions and, in some cases, directly makes
decisions based upon them. It may show, for example, that customers in a
particular location drink significantly more beer in the summer than in the
winter or compared to other locations, although there is no apparent reason
for this. The system may thus automatically change the menu in order to
offer a wider or narrower choice of beer in different seasons or cities.
Significantly, artificial intelligence users need not fully understand why
customers in a specific location are particularly fond of beer to benefit from
this indication. (Is it simply habit, a trend, loyalty to a locally handcrafted
beer, or does beer just match well with the menu according to the prevalent
taste of the people living in a specific area?). They can just adjust the menu.
As the example suggests, machine learning applications, especially
when based on big data, can produce knowledge that we do not already have
and that might be of valuable commercial use. After all, any menu that
accurately targets consumer preferences will fill restaurants and bars. This
intuition is precisely what fueled the growth and expansion of online
platforms such as Amazon and Google, which profit from accurately
predicting consumer preferences and choices. Despite being an
oversimplification of how big data, artificial intelligence, and machine
learning work, the analysis above underscores a fundamental aspect of these
new technologies. Their main output is a predictive activity that provides a
valuable decision-making aid and that, in some instances, may even fully
substitute human decision-makers.73
C. Blockchain Technology and Smart Contracts
Blockchains are distributed ledgers that record information in a manner
that is sequential, unmodifiable, shared, and synchronized among
participants.74 The original idea of a sequential reporting system was put
forward in 1991 in order to ensure the certainty of intellectual property
72. Id.
73. Möslein, supra note 21, at 656.
74. See, e.g., PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW 13–
57 (2018) (explaining the technology behind blockchains); Sinclair Davidson, Primavera De
Filippi & Jason Potts, Blockchains and the economic institutions of capitalism, 14 J.
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 639 (2018) (arguing that blockchains are an institutional innovation).
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rights. Intellectual property rights were supposed to be time-stamped at their
creation and then chained together through hash functions, a method of
cryptography used to convert numbers of any length into fixed-length
numbers.75 These given-length numbers, obtained solving a mathematical
problem, are employed to univocally identify the underlying data in an easily
verifiable way.
The idea was later developed in order to create and manage the worldfamous virtual currency “Bitcoin.”76 Bitcoin transactions are, in fact,
administered on a public blockchain. Participants are able to add blocks of
transaction data, verify their integrity through a chain of hash functions, and
then store a copy of the recordings. The term “blockchain” suggests that the
transactions are bundled together in “blocks” and then chained with one
another through cryptography. In the Bitcoin blockchain, so-called “miners”
compete with each other to bundle transaction data and create new blocks.
Each block is identified by a unique hash function and reflects “the contents
of the previous block, which itself includes a hash function derived from its
predecessor, and so forth, all the way back to the first block in the chain.”77
More specifically, each new block contains transaction data, the previous
hash, a time-stamp, and other data, the “nonce”: a random number, usually
different for every miner, that enables the creation of a new hash.78 The
fastest miner to come up with a valid hash function is rewarded with Bitcoins
for having completed a block that other participants later verify and add to
their copy of the blockchain.79 If any participant in the blockchain were to
alter a block after it is formed and chained to others, its unique hash function
would change in a readily identifiable manner and, as a consequence, all the
hash functions associated with the subsequent blocks would be altered.80
This ensures the integrity and certainty of the recordings for all participants
in the blockchain.

75. Yermack, supra note 23, at 10–11.
76. The Bitcoin blockchain was developed from the idea of Satoshi Nakamoto (a
developer whose real identity is still unknown), laid out in a famous white paper available
online. See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2008),
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
77. Yermack, supra note 23, at 11–12.
78. Id. at 13, 13 n.10.
79. See Daniel Ferreira, Jin Li & Radoslawa Nikolowa, Corporate Capture of
Blockchain Governance (European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Finance Working
Paper No. 593/2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3320437 (discussing
the “proof-of-work” system, which enables decentralized record verification and governance
on blockchains, as well as the risk of blockchain capture by the dominant mining equipment
producer).
80. See, e.g., DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 25; Yermack, supra note 23, at 14.
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A key component of the original blockchain idea was that the sequence
of the recordings should be accessible to the public in order to prevent
alterations and manipulations. In 1991, this could have been done by
publishing the records in a newspaper or on another similar public source.81
In the Bitcoin blockchain, it is ensured by opening the network to all
interested parties, so that each party stores a copy of the blockchain on its
hardware, and by employing a distributed and consensus-based mechanism
to establish what is authentic.82 Indeed, one would have to control over half
of the nodes in the network to tamper with existing records or to make fake
ones; this is generally thought impossible due to the exceptionally high
investment and computing power that it would require, at least for popular
blockchains such as Bitcoin.83
Blockchains may also be private or “permissioned.” This means that
they are restricted to selected members and, in case of permissioned
blockchains, they may be managed by a sponsor according to an agreement
among the parties.84 The sponsor administers the network, has the power to
admit new participants pursuant to the agreement, and verifies the
transactions recorded on the distributed ledger. Permissioned blockchains
offer some of the most promising uses of this technology for firms.85
Corporations could, in fact, establish their own blockchain in order to
register share ownership or for corporate accounting and reporting purposes.
An additional feature of blockchain technology is that participants in
the network can run smart contracts on it. Although there are many
definitions of the term,86 a smart contract is essentially “a computerized
transaction protocol that executes the term of a contract”:87 a set of

81. See Yermack, supra note 23, at 11.
82. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 23–24, 35–38. See also Enriques &
Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 9–10 (explaining the difference between distributed ledgers and
concentrated ledgers with respect to the risk of manipulation or corruption).
83. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 25, 113–14.
84. See, e.g., id. at 31–32; Yermack, supra note 23, at 12, 16; Jun Dai & Miklos A.
Vasarhelyi, Toward Blockchain-Based Accounting and Assurance, 31 J. INFO. SYS. 5, 6–7
(2017) (distinguishing between private and permissioned blockchains).
85. Cf. Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 18, at 127–29 (providing examples of how
permissioned blockchains could be used for shareholder meetings and for the exercise of
shareholder rights).
86. Riccardo de Caria, The Legal Meaning of Smart Contracts, 26 EUR. REV. OF PRIV. L.
731, 734–35 (2019).
87. Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts, U. AMSTERDAM (1994), http://www.fon.hum.
uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.
best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html. See also Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing
Relationships on Public Networks, FIRST MONDAY (1997), https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/
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instructions that is automatically implemented when given conditions are
verified. The terms of the agreement between the parties are written in code
language, which a computer program automatically enforces.
Imagine that two parties use a smart contract to execute a future on
shares,88 agreeing that on a certain date, party A will transfer the ownership
of 100 shares of Company X to party B, at a fixed price of $1,000. These
instructions are embedded in a computer protocol (“coded”) in order to avoid
intermediaries, enforcement costs, contract breaches, and other
impediments. When the date arrives, the computer program will execute the
instructions, transferring the shares from A to B and the money from B to A,
without the need for any further action on their part or the intervention of
any intermediary or enforcer. When smart contracts run on a blockchain, the
parties exploit its network structure to make the transaction immutable and
verifiable. In this case, each party uses its blockchain account to receive and
make the transfers, which are then executed by a computer program directly
on the network. The advantage, especially for public blockchains, is that the
terms of the contract and its enforcement are distributed among many parties,
which jointly record them, ensuring transaction certainty and immutability.89
D. From the Digitalization of Corporate Reporting and Procedures …
Blockchains and smart contracts, in their simplest version of coding
instructions (such as “if A, then B”),90 may lead to a variety of corporate
innovations, ranging from the digitalization of company reporting and
procedures to more structural developments in the role and functioning of
corporate bodies, especially the shareholder meeting.
With respect to the first set of changes, blockchains and smart contracts
could be employed to organize the internal accounting system of
corporations and to automate corporate reporting.91 Business transactions
with third parties could be recorded in real-time through private,
permissioned or even public blockchains, which would ensure certainty and
integrity of the recorded data, as well as access to, and verification by, all

index.php/fm/article/view/548/469. For further discussion on smart contracts, see, e.g., Kevin
Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313 (2017).
88. See generally DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 93–96 (discussing smart
securities and derivatives).
89. See Dai & Vasarhelyi, supra note 84, at 7.
90. Cf. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 29.
91. See, e.g., Dai & Vasarhelyi, supra note 84, passim; Yermack, supra note 23, at 24–
26; Fiammetta S. Piazza, Bitcoin and the Blockchain as Possible Corporate Governance
Tools: Strengths and Weaknesses, 5 PENN ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 262, 295–96 (2017).
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(authorized) participants. Blockchain technology could improve tracking of
internal accounting information, entrusting managers, auditors, and other
chosen parties to validate recordings. Significantly, disclosure of accounting
documents could be provided on a selective basis, grouping identified
recipients in “aggregation levels” that would obtain access to predetermined
parts of the blockchain depending on their role.92 Computer programs could
then build accounting reports and financial statements based on the
blockchain recordings in a traceable and verifiable manner. This system
greatly reduces the risk of accounting manipulation, documentation error,
and fraud93 by adopting a triple-entry accounting mechanism: Transactions
are recorded by the two parties involved and by an independent intermediary,
represented by (all the nodes in) the blockchain.94 The additional advantage
compared to ordinary triple-entry accounting systems is that the blockchain
effectively prevents tampering by third parties, including cyberattacks, given
that the recorded transactions can hardly be modified or altered at a later
date.95
Blockchain-based accounting could also facilitate external auditing by
specialized firms, as well as supervision by the competent governmental
authorities, which could easily have or obtain access to the distributed
ledger.96 Smart contracts could, for example, enable auditors to establish
targeted controls on the recorded transactions. Business rules and accounting
standards could likewise be encoded as smart contracts in a blockchain,
facilitating internal monitoring and external auditing services, thus
preventing possible violations from the outset.97
92. Dai & Vasarhelyi, supra note 84, at 6, 13. For more general observations on the
possibility of granting selective access to the contents of a blockchain to certain authorized
participants, see Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin & Benjamin P. Edwards, Distributed
Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 1, 24 (2017).
93. But see Piazza, supra note 91, at 296 (arguing that companies could still circumvent
reporting duties by maintaining a parallel system of accounting).
94. See Dai & Vasarhelyi, supra note 84, at 10–12 (discussing blockchain accounting).
95. Id. at 10.
96. Cf. id. at 13 (suggesting that smart contracts could be used to automate tax filings
and provide continuous updates to the competent agencies).
97. Smart contracts could be used, for example, to confirm the balance sheet equation.
In this case, “if the balance in the company account is set as the balance in the assets account
less the total balance of the liabilities and equities account, then a smart contract could be
created to monitor the balance of the company account, which issues alerts when the balance
does not equal to zero.” Id. at 12 (also showing, at 12–16, how blockchains and smart contracts
could help verify corporate recordings, enable automatic assurance systems, and modernize
audits). See also DELOITTE, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY. A GAME-CHANGER IN ACCOUNTING?
3–4 (2016), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/de/Documents/Innovation/Blo
ckchain_A%20game-changer%20in%20accounting.pdf.
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Among other promising uses of blockchain technology is its application
to shareholder meetings.98 According to many commentators, blockchains
could successfully administer virtual shareholder meetings by tracing share
transfers and identifying who is entitled to participate in the meeting and
vote;99 registering proxies, voting instructions, and actual votes;100 ensuring
that quorums and majority requirements are met;101 shedding light on empty
voting practices;102 automatically preparing minutes of the meeting;103 and
so forth. Essentially, each voter would be uniquely identified by her
blockchain account and would have voting tokens that she could then
allocate to express her preference for a specific ballot.104 This would readily

98. See, e.g., Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 17, at 172–76; Van der Elst & Lafarre,
supra note 18, at 125–31; CSD WORKING GROUP ON DLT IN COLLABORATION WITH SWIFT,
GENERAL MEETING PROXY VOTING ON DISTRIBUTED LEDGER (2017), https://www.issanet.
org/e/pdf/2017-11_General_Meeting_Proxy_Voting_on_Distributed_Ledger_v2-1.pdf.
99. See, e.g., George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
227, 254–70 (2018); Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 17, at 172–74; Fenwick &
Vermeulen, supra note 39, at 8. Significantly, transfers of assets, including shares, have
already been recorded on the Bitcoin blockchain through a method known as “colored coins.”
Essentially, for each transfer the seller sends the buyer a trivial amount of Bitcoin together
with a “token,” a piece of data identifying the asset that is actually being transferred. As the
blockchain registers the transaction, it also registers the asset transfer. See also DE FILIPPI &
WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 29–30; Yermack, supra note 23, at 16. More recently, several firms
have been experimenting with blockchain-based securities clearance systems. For example,
in August 2019, Securitize, a provider of blockchain-based platforms for token issuance,
announced that it had been registered by the SEC as a transfer agent. This means that it can
serve as the official keeper of records for the transfer of securities. See Press Release,
Securitize becomes an SEC-registered transfer agent to modernize capital markets through
blockchain, SECURITIZE (Aug. 21, 2019), https://staging.website.securitize.io/press/securitizebecomes-an-sec-registered-transfer-agent-to-modernize-capital-markets-through-blockchain.
100. See, e.g., Yermack, supra note 23, at 23–24. For example, Broadridge Financial
Solutions, Inc., a corporate services company, and ICJ, Inc., a joint venture of Broadridge and
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, have developed and executed in a test environment a blockchain
proxy-voting system designed specifically for the Japanese market; it mirrors traditional
proxy voting but automates and simplifies it. See Press Release. ICJ and Broadridge Execute
the First Blockchain-based Interoperable Proxy Voting Process in Japan, BROADRIDGE (Jan.
14, 2019), https://www.broadridge.com/intl/press-release/2019/icj-and-broadridge-executethe-proxy-voting-process.
101. For example, through smart contracts running on blockchain. See BROADRIDGE,
NEXT GENERATION PROXY VOTING. HOW DATA-DRIVEN ANALYTICS, OMNI-CHANNEL
DELIVERY AND BLOCKCHAIN ARE HELPING MUTUAL FUNDS ACHIEVE THEIR PROXY GOALS 11
(2018), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-next-generation-proxy-votingstrategies.pdf.
102. See, e.g., Yermack, supra note 23, at 24; Geis, supra note 99, at 269.
103. For an example with respect to board meetings’ minutes, see Enriques & Zetzsche,
supra note 16, at 11.
104. See, e.g., Yermack, supra note 23, at 23.
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enable distant voting and ensure certainty in voter identification and vote
counts.
Clearly, blockchain technology is particularly suited to the most
important function attributed to shareholder meetings: voting expression.
Physical meetings, however, also perform other functions, including
disseminating information and establishing a forum for participant
discussion.105 Critics of virtual shareholder meetings have long claimed that
only physical gatherings can effectively serve all of these purposes at
once.106 This observation, however, does not apply, at least with the same
strength, to blockchain-based shareholder meetings. Blockchains themselves
may provide technical support in spreading information and enabling
discussion, and they could even be supplemented by other devices, as simple
as private platforms for communication, aimed at fostering dialogue among
shareholders.107 The advantages of greater certainty in the administration of
voting procedures must, in any case, be balanced with the shortcomings of
current voting systems, which often do not even identify sure winners,108 and
with shareholder absenteeism and rational apathy, which, especially in
public corporations, suggest that the benefits of physical meetings might not
be that important after all.109
E. … to Autonomous Algorithmic Entities
While blockchains and smart contracts promise to facilitate, digitalize,
and improve corporate accounting and shareholder meetings, algorithms
could help corporations make the transition to what has been called

105. See, e.g., Zetzsche, supra note 17, at 7–8, 13–14 (observing that shareholder
meetings might also trigger a review of management’s activities). But see Van der Elst &
Lafarre, supra note 17, at 167–71 (arguing that securities regulation and investor demands for
information undermine the information function of the general meeting and that even the
forum and decision-making functions are flawed in many respects); Van der Elst & Lafarre,
supra note 18, at 122 (reporting that shareholders are not using the annual general meeting as
a forum for discussion, since they mostly vote through distance voting mechanisms).
106. Cf. Ralph Simmonds, Why must we meet? Thinking about why shareholders meetings
are required, 19 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 506 (2001); Elizabeth Boros, Virtual Shareholder
Meetings, 3 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1 (2004).
107. See Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 17, at 175 (on the use of blockchain-based
platforms as a digital forum for discussion); Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 18, at 128
(also on blockchains as a discussion and communication tool). See also Zetsche, supra note 17,
at 56–58 (proposing the use of “shareholder conferences” and chat boards for communications).
108. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 18, at 1248–70, 1279.
109. Cf. Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 17, at 175.
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“algorithmic management”: Delegating the power to make business
decisions to algorithms and other artificial intelligence tools.110
The extent to which algorithmic management can affect legal entities’
decision-making processes may range from providing simple advisory
services to directors and managers—for example, in the form of predictions,
recommendations, and other information—to substituting one or more
human decision-makers. Algorithms may easily supplant middle managers
by setting work shifts, scheduling workers’ activities, assigning duties, and
monitoring worker performance, as they do in certain gig economy
companies, including Amazon and Uber.111 They could also conveniently
replace corporate directors.112 As incredible as it may seem, this is already a
reality. A venture capital firm from Hong Kong, Deep Knowledge Ventures,
became famous in 2014 for having nominated a machine-learning algorithm
to its board of directors. The algorithm, called “Validating Investment Tool
for Advancing Life Science” (or “VITAL”), specializes in investment
valuation and, even though it is technically not a board member, it has been
given a vote on investment decisions.113 Other complex algorithms may be
capable of making business recommendations and decisions on a more
general basis. An example is IBM’s artificial intelligence program named
“Watson,” which, despite its prohibitive cost, might be able to adapt its
decisions to changing circumstances.114
Although current technology seems relatively far from offering
integrated applications for general corporate management,115 in the near
future programmers might develop new machine learning algorithms that
110. The expression “algorithmic management” has also been used in a slightly narrower
sense to signify “the use of data and algorithms to hire, direct, monitor, schedule, or discipline
workers.” For this definition, see Rogers, supra note 5, at 535, 535 n.19. Rogers recalls that
the expression seems to have become popular after being used in Ming Kyung Lee et al.,
Working with Machines: The Impact of Algorithmic and Data-Driven Management on Human
Workers, in CHI 2015: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33RD ANNUAL CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 1603, 1603 (2015), https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/
2702123.2702548.
111. See infra Part III.C.2.a.
112. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
113. Rob Wile, A Venture Capital Firm Just Named an Algorithm to Its Board of
Directors: Here’s What It Actually Does, BUS. INSIDER (May 14, 2014, 1:19 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/vital-named-to-board-2014-5; Jordyn Taylor, V.C. Firm
Names Robot to Board of Directors, OBSERVER (May 13, 2014, 7:00 AM), https://observer.
com/2014/05/v-c-firm-names-robot-to-board-of-directors. The case of VITAL has attracted a
great deal of attention also in the legal scholarship. See, e.g., Martin Petrin, Corporate
Management in the Age of AI, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 965, 966–68.
114. Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887, 900 (2018).
115. Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 107.
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will be able to run simple and not-so-simple businesses at lower costs. One
could easily imagine an algorithm that manages a vending machine
business,116 ordering supplies online,117 tracking inventories, keeping its own
accounting, and contracting for workers to periodically fill in the different
automats. Algorithms could also conduct more complex businesses, such as
a tour operator or a hotel. An algorithm could keep track of tourists’ requests,
make bookings online, process payments, check availabilities, respond to
complaints, and hire agents for all the other tasks that it cannot physically
do.118
As a result, some commentators have started to question whether such
algorithms could actually control business entities with very limited or no
human intervention or participation,119 such as algorithmic subsidiary
companies that perform selected and narrow functions,120 which could be an
intermediate step toward fully self-driving corporations and groups. The idea
was first put forward by Shawn Bayern, who claimed that U.S. law would
permit memberless entities exclusively managed and controlled by
algorithms, de facto granting legal personhood to such autonomous
systems.121 Legal constraints to this possibility could come from provisions
prohibiting memberless entities or requiring that organizations be managed
by natural persons.122 U.S. limited liability companies (LLC) would,
however, be flexible enough to host autonomous systems. Default rules on
boards of directors do not prevent algorithmic management and, according
to Bayern, state law would also allow LLCs that become memberless over

116. The example of the vending machine is taken from Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins,
Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1485, 1494
(2014).
117. Significantly, this task could be carried out with the help of a smart contract. DE
FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 82–83.
118. See LoPucki, supra note 114, at 899.
119. Cf. id. at 897 (providing a definition of algorithmic control over an entity).
120. Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 106–07.
121. Bayern, supra note 116, at 1495–98; Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern
Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93,
96, 101–04 (2015). See generally Shawn Bayern et al., Company Law and Autonomous
Systems: A Blueprint for Lawyers, Entrepreneurs, and Regulators, 9 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH.
L.J. 135 (2017) (discussing how autonomous systems could inhabit legal entities in different
jurisdictions). See also DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 146–55 (on decentralized
autonomous organizations running on blockchain).
122. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing
Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1056, 1099–1101 (2014) (supporting, more
generally, the reform of mandatory law provisions requiring that boards of directors be
comprised of natural persons in order to permit firms to provide professional board services
to corporations).
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time to continue their operations, at least for a certain period of time, under
the exclusive control of an artificially intelligent algorithm.123 Even if this
did not occur, circular shareholdings could achieve a comparable result. A
natural or legal person could establish two LLCs, company A and company
B, both managed by an artificially intelligent algorithm. If company A were
admitted as a member of company B and vice versa, the founder could
withdraw from both companies, leaving them in the exclusive control of the
autonomous system. In this way, the problem created by a prohibition on
memberless entities would be avoided, since each company would
technically have one member.124 According to other scholars, a similar result
could be reached with other business entity forms and in different
jurisdictions,125 taking advantage of the possibility to establish
algorithmically controlled entities in countries where regulatory standards
are low, since they could still do business elsewhere.126 De facto control
could, in any case, be granted to algorithms by employing various
expedients, such as contractual provisions delegating all decision-making
powers to the algorithm127 or hiring complacent directors128 (if, for instance,
local law required that the board be comprised of at least one or more natural
persons). After all, algorithms already seem better than humans at making
many decisions, including selecting prospective corporate directors.129
For our purposes, the technicalities regarding how this result may be
achieved in practice are not as important as the mere fact that the prospect of
a legal entity entirely run and managed by an artificially intelligent algorithm
is not so absurd or far-fetched. Leaving aside the accountability issues and
policy concerns that autonomous algorithmic entities raise,130 the sole
possibility of delegating management, in whole or in part, to an algorithm
123. Bayern, supra note 116, at 1496–97; Bayern, supra note 121, at 101–04.
124. Bayern, supra note 121, at 104 n.43. See LoPucki, supra note 114, at 898–99
(contending that, while it is doubtful that LLC statutes permit memberless entities, circular
shareholdings could achieve that result).
125. See LoPucki, supra note 114, at 907–12, 919–24; Bayern et al., supra note 121, at
139–53.
126. Cf. LoPucki, supra note 114, at 926–28.
127. Bayern, supra note 121, at 99 (discussing the “process-agreement equivalence
principle”).
128. LoPucki, supra note 114, at 913–18.
129. See Isil Erel et al., Selecting Directors Using Machine Learning (European Corporate
Governance Institute (ECGI) Finance Working Paper No. 605/2019, 2020), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144080 (showing that algorithms accurately predict
director performance).
130. Cf. LoPucki, supra note 114, at 901–06 (arguing that algorithmic control may pose
a threat, amplified by the fact that governments often do not meaningfully regulate the legal
entities that algorithms could inhabit).
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provokes compelling questions regarding the impact of new technologies on
existing corporate roles and functions. Are these new technologies
effectively going to deliver on their promise to fundamentally change how
shareholders, directors, and managers interact with one another within the
corporation? And will they effectively replace directors and managers? To
answer these questions, it is crucial to understand the reasons that underlie
the current assignment of powers and responsibilities among corporate
bodies and to see if and how technology affects them. Parts II and III discuss
these aspects.
II. CORPORATE ROLES AND THE BEST DECISION-MAKER PROBLEM
Although there is no widely accepted definition of the term, corporate
governance refers to the way corporations are run131 and, more specifically,
to their internal workings. It expresses a view that has taken hold since the
1970s, according to which “the particular balance of power, organizational
structure, and decision-making processes within the corporation matter
deeply for economic and social life.”132 The emphasis is on the distribution
of roles, powers, and competences within corporate organizations, as a way
to spur corporate behavior toward desired economic and social ends.
Especially over the last decades, stricter rules on board composition,
independent directors, executive compensation, and so forth have been
deployed as a panacea for all corporate problems. Legal reforms, however,
are not the only determinants of corporate governance; they are, in a way,
built upon other transformations, which indirectly contribute to affect the
internal workings of corporations. The legal scholarship has, for instance,
shown that the increased informativeness of stock market prices, together
with the widespread adoption of the shareholder value maximization norm,
made it possible to empower outsiders with monitoring functions, giving rise
to the now ubiquitous board role of the independent director.133 Similarly,
the growth of pension funds and institutional investors has encouraged

131. For a broad definition of corporate governance, comprising “everything that
influences the way that a corporation is actually run” and/or that “exercises power over
decision-making within a corporation,” see JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 2 (2008).
132. Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L. 359, 362–
63 (2016). See generally Gilson, supra note 28 (on the shift from corporate law to corporate
governance that has taken hold since the 1970s).
133. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
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greater shareholder empowerment134 through, for example, proxy access
rules and increased disclosure.
This article argues that new technologies have the potential to introduce
similar changes in corporate governance by affecting one or more of the
fundamental determinants along which corporate law typically distributes
power between shareholders, directors, and managers. These include factors
that relate to the way decisions must or should be made, such as the timing
and frequency of the decisions, the availability of the necessary information,
and the costs of deciding, as well as factors that are more deeply connected
with the personal features of the decision-makers, such as their incentives,
competence, and skills.135
The distribution of power within corporate enterprises is not immutable,
and corporate governance may be altered when transformations indicate that
the best decision-maker on a certain matter has shifted. Shareholders might,
for instance, have the best incentives to make a particular decision, but they
may lack information or competence, and the costs of acquiring them may
be prohibitively high. Accordingly, the optimal allocation of responsibilities
might lie in assigning the decision to the board of directors or even to
corporate officers, devising governance mechanisms that tie management’s
incentives to shareholder preferences. If new factors were to lower these
costs or make the necessary information or competence more accessible to
the shareholders, the conclusion might change. It is, for example, no
coincidence that the rise of highly competent institutional investors led to

134.

See Brian R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate Governance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK
46, 52–54 (Douglas Michael Wright et al. eds., 2013).
135. A theory of voting rights in (private) corporations has been put forward by Melvin
A. Eisenberg, who offered a taxonomy of the factors that should be considered to determine
which matters shareholders would expect to decide, as opposed to those that they would rather
leave to management. The distinctions in the text draw from Eisenberg’s classifications. See
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1969). A conceptually similar way
to look at the issue addressed in Part II is to ask which factors are relevant in establishing
whether decision-making authority should be governed by a consensus-based system,
assigning decision-making power to the organization’s constituents (such as the
shareholders), or by authority and fiat, with a central decision-making body that has the power
to bind the organization and its members (such as the board of directors, eventually operating
through its officers). KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68-70 (1974). In this
respect, the five factors identified in Part II also draw from the observation that “[t]he choice
between consensus and authority is driven by three considerations: access to information,
member interests and preferences, and severity of collective action problems.” Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Board of Directors, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE 275, 293 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (citing Arrow’s
work).
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
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calls for greater shareholder empowerment and, in the United States, to the
declining influence of Delaware courts in regulating corporations.136 The
reverse is, in any case, also possible. One could imagine that the growing
complexity of certain decisions might lead to greater board involvement or
to the rise of specialized corporate functions tasked with advisory,
investigatory, or even decision-making powers, further removing
shareholders from any significant deliberative capacity.
Technology might be precisely the factor leading to such a reshuffling
of corporate roles and functions. It has the potential to reduce information
asymmetries and collective decision-making costs for shareholders, which
have often justified a stronger role for management. It may also help align
managerial behavior with shareholder preferences, enabling more direct
shareholder control, or even require that managers acquire new competences
and skills. Changes need not, and probably will not, be radical. Nevertheless,
they will likely alter corporate governance as we know it.
A. The Frequency and Timing of the Decisions
Decision-making power within the corporation is distributed among “a
board of directors, which manages the corporation’s business; officers, who,
as agents of the board, execute its bidding; and shareholders, who elect the
board” and decide on fundamental changes and transactions.137 In modern
public corporations, the board of directors mostly performs a monitoring138
and policy-making role in the interest of the shareholders, delegating
operational decisions and day-to-day management to a team of appointed
officers.139 It would, however, be a mistake to think that corporate directors’
deliberative capacity is necessarily sporadic or limited. The board’s
136. See Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 263 (2019).
137. Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 4.
138. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 162–70 (1976)
(arguing that the board of directors is uniquely suited to monitor management). See also
Gordon, supra note 133, at 1510–40 (discussing the changing role of corporate boards and
the rise of independent directors and the monitoring board).
139. Policy-making here is meant broadly. Corporate directors often do not have the time
and ability to craft or influence corporate strategy in the strict sense. See EISENBERG, supra
note 138, at 139–48. However, they sometimes provide advice and counsel to company
executives, are involved in certain fundamental decisions, such as mergers, and monitor the
implementation of strategies and policies put in place by company executives and employees.
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 277–79; Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 22.
But see MACEY, supra note 131, at 51–68 (challenging the view that directors can at the same
time effectively advise and monitor management, and discussing the possibility of board
capture by management).
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monitoring role entails important decision-making activities, such as
nominating executive officers, setting their pay, and voting on major
transactions.140
This distribution of powers is, first and foremost, justified by the way
certain decisions must be made. If decisions must be made frequently,
directors and officers are in a better position than shareholders to make them.
Officers may do so on a daily basis, devoting most of their efforts and time
to the corporation. The board of directors, as the corporation’s monitoring
and policy-making body, may also act relatively frequently.141 By contrast,
especially in large publicly held corporations, shareholders do not have the
time and are not interested in voting on routine matters. When decisions have
to be taken swiftly or periodically, calling a meeting of the shareholders
might bring undue delays and setbacks, which is why these decisions are
usually left to officers and directors.142
B. Asymmetries of Information
Clearly, the frequency or speed at which certain decisions must be made
cannot be the only relevant circumstance in deciding whether the
shareholders have a legitimate expectation to a vote or whether the
deliberation is, instead, better left to management. It is, however, an
important factor that explains why (routine) business decisions—which
typically require repeated action and speed, such as whether to buy a specific
piece of machinery or what amount of raw material the company should buy
from a particular supplier—by law fall within the powers of managers,143
under the guidance and supervision of the board of directors.

140. EISENBERG, supra note 138, at 158–59, 162–65; Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note
122, at 1053. See Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 283–84 (arguing that the board of directors
also performs a managerial function, because even though it reviews proposals made by
management it has ultimate responsibility on a variety of basic corporate decisions).
141. This aspect should not be overstated. Board meetings occur more frequently than
shareholder meetings, but still a few times a year, which makes it impossible for the board to
actually manage the corporation. See EISENBERG, supra note 138, at 141–43. See also Petrin,
supra note 113, at 973, 975; Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 122, at 1061, 1064–65. It
is nevertheless significant that board meetings can be convened more easily than shareholder
meetings, if need be. Moreover, the time that directors devote to board service seems to have
increased in recent years. Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 319, 327.
142. See, e.g., Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 17, at 168, 170 (observing that the need
to provide relevant information to the shareholders before the meeting and the corresponding
notice requirements make it impractical to convene the shareholder meeting for actions that
have to be taken swiftly).
143. Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 10–11.
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Other related reasons concern the availability of the relevant
information and, more generally, the costs of collective decision-making.144
Those who are more directly involved in managing the corporation have
greater access to information on company operations, which makes them
suited to make choices on a daily basis. This does not mean that corporations
could not devise disclosure mechanisms aimed at bringing shareholders up
to speed. There are, however, compelling reasons not to do so in all
circumstances, as well as some practical hurdles. Greater disclosure to a
larger number of people might raise, for instance, insider trading concerns.
It may also hamper the prospects of closing a deal, if information is
circulated too early. This suggests that even assuming that parity of
information between shareholders and managers were feasible, it might not
be desirable. The resulting asymmetry of information justifies, in turn, a
greater decision-making role for corporate management.145
C. The Costs of Collective Decision-Making
Large corporate bodies, as shareholder meetings tend to be, also incur
significant decision-making costs; the cost of circulating information on the
subject matter of the decision, typically covered by the corporation, is only
a part of these costs. They include the cost of obtaining information on other
shareholders’ voting intentions, communicating among shareholders, and
coordinating voting behavior in the general meeting.146 The greater the
number of shareholders, the higher these costs are likely to be.147
Furthermore, collective action itself entails the risk (and thus the cost) of
reaching inefficient decisions,148 which increases with the heterogeneity of
the preferences (and possibly the number) of the people involved in the
deliberation, as voting outcomes tend to reflect the preferences of the median

144. See generally Armour et al., supra note 13, at 11–12 (on the information and
coordination costs of shareholder meetings).
145. Significantly, the availability of information is one of the factors that contribute to
determine shareholder voting efficiency. Michael C. Schouten, The Mechanisms of Voting
Efficiency, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 763, 780–81.
146. See Zetzsche, supra note 17, at 38–39 (describing the costs of exercising shareholder
rights). See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 41–42 (1996) (on
the “costs of the collective choice process”).
147. Because the number of the communication channels among shareholders also
increases. See Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 302.
148. See generally Schouten, supra note 145 (identifying the four mechanisms—informed
voting, rational voting, independent voting, and sincere voting—that determine shareholder
voting efficiency).
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voter instead of those of the average voter.149 Finally, the average voter could
also be wrong.150 The result is that (large) shareholder meetings entail higher
decision-making costs than board meetings or single officers, suggesting that
on ordinary matters directors and officers are in fact the best-decision makers
within the corporation.
D. Incentives
Another way of looking at how power should be split among corporate
bodies is to ask who has the best incentive to decide or who is less prone to
opportunistic behaviors and conflicts of interest. For instance, stockholders
are said to have the best incentives to decide on structural decisions, such as
mergers or liquidations, because their investment is at stake.151 In contrast,
directors might oppose these decisions, especially if they know or expect that
they will lose their jobs afterward. Directors also have distorted incentives
when it comes to control decisions, such as the appointment and removal of
board members, changes in voting rules (e.g., the introduction and regulation
of cumulative voting or slate voting), resolutions on the information flows to
stockholders, and so forth.152 Structural and control decisions are not taken
frequently and are usually considered and examined over long time spans,153
enabling the corporation to provide shareholders with the necessary
information and to engage the shareholder meeting in the deliberation.
Incentives complete the picture, identifying which party might be more selfinterested in the specific matter or has, instead, the best motivation to
consider the issue.
To be sure, incentives are never clear-cut and thus are seldom decisive
for the law. Consider a charter amendment that introduces a class of
preferred stock with enhanced financial rights or a new common stock issue.
Both changes might have an impact on the value of the preexisting common
stock and affect controlling interests within the corporation, which suggests
149. HANSMANN, supra note 146, at 39–41. See Schouten, supra note 145, at 802–05
(explaining how heterogenous preferences may lead to conflicted voting and thus to insincere
voting, which undermines voting efficiency). See also Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 293–94
(on shareholders’ heterogenous preferences).
150. The average voter could, in fact, prefer a non-value-maximizing decision. Cf.
Schouten, supra note 145, at 780.
151. Cf. Randall S. Thomas & Paul H. Edelman, The theory and practice of corporate
voting at US public companies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 459, 467
(Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015).
152. See Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 13 (from whom the examples in the text are also
drawn).
153. See id. (with respect to structural decisions).
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that shareholders ought to vote on them.154 In fact, directors could promote
changes in the company’s capital structure to favor certain shareholders to
the detriment of others, depending on who would be more eager to support
their re-election at the next ballot. However, shareholders might also have
distorted incentives. They may oppose these changes despite the
corporation’s need for additional capital in order not to see their financial
rights comparatively diminished or their stakes diluted. In contrast, corporate
directors could be motivated by the need to provide the company with
necessary financial resources and, thus, by a legitimate business concern.
This is why different legal systems devise solutions that, even for
structural and control decisions, involve to a certain extent both directors and
shareholders. In the examples outlined above, U.S. law grants shareholders
the power to amend the articles of incorporation, while the board of directors
generally retains the power to propose such amendments. The board of
directors may issue new shares, but only within the limits set forth by the
law and the corporate charter itself, and thus by the shareholders.155 In civil
law systems, this balance may be reached in different ways, but it also
ordinarily requires action by both of the aforementioned corporate
constituencies. For example, in the European Union, new issues of stock are
subject to a vote in the shareholder meeting, but the board of directors may
be authorized in the corporation’s charter or by the shareholder meeting to
issue new stock within the limits specified in the authorization.156 The same
is true for mergers. Both in the United States and in Europe, mergers require
the approval of the board of directors and the shareholders, which each
contribute, in different roles and capacities, to the positive outcome of the
transaction. The board of directors and its officers negotiate and approve the
terms of the merger, making sure that the shareholders receive fair
consideration for their ownership interest in the merged enterprise. In turn,
shareholders have the final say on the deal, which generally entails an
amendment to the company’s governing documents.157
154. See Thomas & Edelman, supra note 151, at 467 (arguing that shareholders should
vote on issues that relate to, or might have an impact on, the stock price or firm value).
155. Edward Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 171, 177, 180–
81 (3d ed. 2017). Notably, U.S. case law held that the board of directors may not issue stock
for the purpose of reallocating control. Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 144. This constraint aims
at preventing opportunistic behaviors. Without it, corporate directors could be tempted to alter
the capital structure of the corporation in order to grant control to indulgent shareholders.
156. Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June
2017 relating to certain aspects of company law, 2017 O.J. (L 169) 46, art. 68. See also Rock
et al., supra note 155, at 181.
157. Cf. Rock et al., supra note 155, at 183–85.
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E. Competence and Skills
Interestingly, shared competence of the shareholders and the board may
also be understood, if not in terms of incentives, by looking at the skills that
are involved in deliberations.158 To this end, scholars have distinguished
between investment skills and business skills.159 Shareholders are commonly
assumed to have the first (or to be able to easily acquire them by hiring an
investment advisor), while directors and officers have the latter. After all, the
very reason shareholders hire managers is that managers “can run a business
more competently than they can, thereby increasing firm value.”160
Accordingly, when a decision involves investment skills, shareholders
should be entrusted with the power to make it, while when only business
skills are at stake, the decision should rest with the board of directors and its
officers. This distinction has, for instance, been invoked to justify, on a
theoretical level, why shareholders should vote on a merger or a company
liquidation. The idea is that
the skills involved in formulating a decision to merge with
Corporation B or to liquidate Corporation B are similar to the skills
involved in formulating a decision to invest in Corporation B, and
quite different from the skills needed to formulate an advertising
campaign, conduct employee relations, or make steel. Management
may or may not have the skill to make such decisions. On the other
hand, shareholders … normally will have such skills, even though
they may be unequipped to make ordinary or extraordinary business
decisions.161
Upon closer investigation, however, corporate decisions rarely involve
only one set of skills. Shareholders of company A, which is about to merge
with company B, may be better equipped to evaluate whether company B is
a good investment. The board of directors is, nevertheless, a better judge of
158. Principal-cost theory underscores that competence is a fundamental determinant in
the allocation of control rights within firms. See Goshen & Squire, supra note 24, passim.
159. Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 10.
160. Goshen & Squire, supra note 24, at 785 (also noting that competence is, indeed, “[a]
more compelling explanation for the separation of ownership and control” than, for instance,
the need to aggregate capital from different investors). As a matter of fact, competence also
explains why even wholly owned firms, for which aggregation of capital is not an issue,
delegate management to a professional body. Id. at 769–70, 772, 780.
161. Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 12–13. Accord Rock et al., supra note 155, at 174. The
excerpt included in the text refers to shareholders in privately held corporations, but the same
considerations remain valid for publicly held companies as well.
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the synergies, economies of scale or scope, and other similar efficiencies that
may arise as a result of the merger. Consequently, the law commonly
preserves a key role for the board of directors (and its officers) in negotiating
and closing such transactions, despite giving decisive weight to the vote of
the shareholder meeting.
Moreover, while some investors, such as hedge funds and other activist
institutional investors, may also be well-equipped to make or advise on
business decisions, other investors may not even have basic investment skills
and may need to acquire them—for example, by investing in a fund managed
by a professional management company or by hiring a third-party specialist
such as an investment consultant. Reality is, as always, more complex than
its depictions, but the fundamental distinction between investment skills and
business skills helps stress the fact that in large corporations, investors and
managers tend to “specialize” in their respective roles.
In short, the law distributes power among corporate bodies based on
considerations that concern what decisions must be made and how, including
(i) the speed and frequency of the decisions; (i) the information necessary to
decide and who has access to it; (iii) the costs inherent in assigning decisionmaking responsibilities to a collegial body;162 (iv) the decision-makers’
incentives and interests; (v) their competence and skills. These
considerations often point at a specific corporate role as the best decisionmaker. Just as often, they justify shared competence and responsibility.
F. Monitoring and Decision-Making
The five factors identified above prove just as important in
understanding the allocation of monitoring responsibilities, which also
involve decision-making duties. The board of directors monitors
management on behalf of the shareholders and, in carrying out this activity,
makes the crucial decision of appointing and removing key company
executives. Significantly, the board chooses the chief executive officer163 and
decides on executive compensation, which shapes executives’ incentives in
running the business.

162. Note that the overall cost of collective decision-making may also depend upon the
speed and frequency of the decisions and the need to disseminate information. As a
consequence, considerations regarding points (i)–(iii) of the list in the text may partly overlap
in practice.
163. EISENBERG, supra note 138, at 162–65, 162 n.88 (also observing that besides
selecting and dismissing the members of the chief executive’s office, the board is generally
entrusted with the task of choosing other major officers and, at times, also minor officers).
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It is easy to see why the board is entrusted with this task. Selecting key
executives does not need to be done on a daily basis or within a short time
frame, but the board’s costs of collegial decision-making are relatively low
compared to the shareholder meeting. The information that is necessary to
decide on an appointment is often readily available to the board and does not
depend on having close and direct involvement in the business. Most
importantly, board members have the necessary skills to evaluate candidates
and make the selection, provided that they too often serve or have served as
executives for other companies.164 Similar considerations apply in dismissal
decisions. Consider the competence and knowledge required to assess
whether low performance is the result of excessive risk-taking or,
conversely, whether high performance is mainly obtained by sacrificing
necessary investments.165 Corporate directors seem better equipped than
shareholders to make the decision. One could thus very well say that the
shareholders hire the board to select and dismiss the chief executive officer
and the other executives because company directors are expected to make a
more competent choice than them.
More broadly, time availability, the frequency with which monitoring
should occur, the coordination costs among principals (which grow with the
number of principals involved),166 the expertise and skills necessary to
evaluate agents’ actions, and the incentives to take corrective measures are
all circumstances that determine who should be in charge of supervision. All
of these factors explain why the board’s monitoring role is, or should be,
more pervasive than shareholders’ direct monitoring and why directors are
usually said to monitor corporate management “on behalf of” the
shareholders. Provided that shareholders do not have the time, desire, and
often expertise to monitor corporate management directly,167 in modern
corporations the board of directors serves as a check on managerial action in
the interest of the shareholders. Directors have greater access to relevant
information, including inside information, and sit on a board that ensures
more compact, agile, and smooth decision-making. They have the expertise
and skill to evaluate and understand corporate performance, and they might
even have comparatively better incentives to monitor the business, due to

164. On all these aspects, id. at 163–64.
165. Cf. id. at 165.
166. See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and
Legal Strategies, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 29, 30 (3d ed. 2017).
167. Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 280. See EISENBERG, supra note 138, at 167.
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reputational constrains and compensation mechanisms that are tied to stock
price performance.168
To be sure, shareholders perform some monitoring functions as well,
which are assisted by the power to appoint and remove the members of the
board and by the right to cast their vote on executive compensation, although
in an advisory capacity.169 However, they naturally play a more modest role
than corporate directors. This is mainly because, as opposed to the board,
they typically do not have the skill and information to evaluate
management’s business decisions and strategies. They do have an
instrument, the stock price, to evaluate whether management is running the
business in accordance with their interests, but this only implies that for them
the “monitoring decision” ultimately comes down to whether the investment
is still sound or not.170
III. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE DISTRIBUTION
OF CORPORATE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
This Part examines the likely effect of twenty-first-century technologies
on corporate governance, arguing that while their impact may be substantial,
it is not free of constraints. Big data, algorithms, artificial intelligence,
blockchains, and smart contracts may, to various extents, alter the five
aforementioned determinants of corporate governance. Technology thus
might, on its own, induce some changes in the distribution of powers and
responsibilities among corporate constituencies. However, several
constraints—including mandatory corporate law—play an important role in
enabling more radical transformations.
The combined effect of the new technologies on the five factors
discussed in Part II can be summarized as follows. Generally, these
technologies enable more frequent and timely decisions, reduce information
asymmetries, and curtail the costs of collective decision-making. They
facilitate fast and secure communications and interactions. Accordingly,
even those corporate bodies, such as the board of directors and the

168. Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 21. See EISENBERG, supra note 138, at 162–
70 (arguing that the board is particularly suited to monitor management).
169. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010).
170. Cf. Thomas & Edelman, supra note 151, at 462–63 (arguing that shareholders are the
only constituency whose sole certainty of returns is directly tied to changes in the stock price,
and that the vote is “almost uniquely useful in providing the shareholders with the ability to
monitor the board to insure it protects” their interest to maximize the residual value of the
firm as reflected in the stock price).
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shareholder meeting, that are not involved in activities that require repeated
or speedy action could become more engaged in corporate affairs. This is
particularly true for the board of directors, as shareholders might still not
have the time to or be interested in taking part in many corporate decisions.
The new technologies also help reduce asymmetries of information and
extricate communications from corporate management’s exclusive control.
Blockchains and smart contracts could, for instance, make corporate
documents and data more readily available to shareholders and directors,
while at the same time preserving the integrity and authenticity of the
information. Technology could therefore contribute to make shareholders
and the board more informed about management’s conduct, with potential
repercussions on the allocation of monitoring responsibilities.
Faster and more secure exchanges via blockchain could also greatly
reduce the costs of collective decision-making. Unlike other previous
technologies, blockchains ensure tamper-proof communications, the
certainty of recordings, and a safe platform for sharing data and information.
These advantages are particularly important for the shareholder meeting,
which typically incurs in high decision-making costs due to the large number
of participants. A limit to the possible improvements in the functioning of
the shareholder meeting is, however, that technology cannot homogenize
shareholders’ preferences, whose heterogeneity conversely raises collective
decision-making costs.
On the whole, the impact of the new technologies on the first three
dimensions along which corporate law typically distributes power (i.e., the
speed and frequency of the decisions; the information necessary to decide
and who has access to it; and the costs of collective decision-making) seems
to lead to greater shareholder empowerment by facilitating access to
information, communications, and voting. Some constraints are, however,
immediately apparent. First, despite the possibility of acquiring a more
prominent role within the corporation, shareholders might still not be
interested in greater engagement. Second, collective decision-making costs
can only be reduced through technology, not eliminated. A radical
transformation of the role of shareholders is, thus, improbable. In contrast,
the board of directors might come out strengthened by the adoption of new
technologies, benefiting from wider access to company information, less
reliance on information flows originating from executive officers, and
greater speed and security in communications. Notably, the two constraints
that limit shareholder empowerment do not really apply to the board.
The other two factors that corporate law considers when allocating
power among corporate constituencies namely, incentives and competence
or skills point in the same direction and actually cast further doubt on the
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scope and likelihood of technology-enabled shareholder empowerment.
Technology does not affect incentives. It cannot make directors and
managers less interested in keeping their jobs, nor does it alter shareholder
preferences and motivations. Moreover, technological innovations
supplement competence and expertise, but they hardly provide these skills
to those who lack them. At most, they provide information or
recommendations to people who already know how to make appropriate use
of both. Incentives and competence will thus continue to shape the
distribution of power within corporate enterprises to a non-negligible extent,
further limiting the magnitude of the changes that technology can produce in
this respect.
Against this general background, this Part examines in greater detail
how we can expect the role of shareholders, directors, and managers to
change following the widespread adoption of twenty-first-century
technologies. Section A addresses the increased ability of shareholders to
obtain information, communicate among themselves, and engage in direct
monitoring, reducing agency costs and potentially downsizing the board’s
monitoring role. Section B discusses the likelihood of more direct
“shareholder democracy” and the ensuing possibility that shareholders
become involved in business decisions, arguing that competence represents
a significant constraint to enabling direct shareholder democracy in practice.
Section C analyzes the changing role of corporate directors and managers
and contends that the board might come out strengthened in its decisionmaking role, to the detriment of lower-level decision-makers.
Clearly, a broad and logically foregoing potential limit to
technologically induced change is the very adoption of new technologies by
corporations, which rests in the hands of directors and especially
managers.171 Some of these constituencies might have an incentive to “fight
back” against this process or to use technology to further their own
interests.172 For the sake of the analysis, however, Part III assumes that
corporations will implement new technologies in their organizations to their
fullest potential, as is increasingly the case.

171. Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 44.
172. See id. at 7–8, 31, 42 (arguing that as long as management continues to control the
code selection and design process, technology will further its interests within the firm).
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A. Shareholders in the Twenty-First Century: Agency Problems and
Monitoring
While management often mediates exchanges among shareholders and
between shareholders and the corporation by deciding which information
should be communicated, to whom, and how, the board of directors serves
an intermediary role by monitoring management on behalf of the
shareholders. A first set of issues concerns whether with the advent of new
technologies corporate management and the board will lose their
intermediary function and, in particular, whether shareholders will take over
or downsize the board’s monitoring of executive officers and managers by
engaging in more direct supervision.173
1. The Limited Disintermediation of Information Sharing within the
Corporation
Corporate management operates as an information intermediary.174
When shareholders want to provide information to other shareholders in
preparation for a meeting, they must go through the corporation and thus
through corporate management. Shareholder petitions to the corporation are
typically forwarded by management; this offers directors and officers the
opportunity to consider each issue in advance and provide a response.175
Significantly, it is the corporation (and, indirectly, the shareholders)
providing the resources in these cases, even when information flows
originate not from the shareholders but from directors that wish to obtain
proxies.
These constraints might be justified by the need to ensure integrity,
parity, and comprehensiveness of information to the benefit of all
shareholders, by corporate secrecy reasons, and by the drawbacks of
previous technologies. Older technologies automate procedures and
safeguard electronic exchanges only imperfectly, and the risk of inaccuracies
and tampering while using them remains high. Consequently, although law
reforms facilitated direct shareholder communication and distant voting,
with some noteworthy exceptions they did not come close to displacing

173. Id. at 15–20, 33–42 (presenting and discussing the “board disintermediation
hypothesis”).
174. Zetzsche, supra note 17, at 32.
175. See id. See also MACEY, supra note 131, at 201 (observing that “[b]efore an issue
even gets to the shareholders for approval, it must almost always first pass through the board
of directors for its approval.”).
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managers from their intermediary role or to allowing fully virtual
shareholder meetings.
The obstacles outlined above might now be partly overcome through
blockchains and smart contracts. These technological advances guarantee
safer communications and traceable information dissemination, more
accurate reporting on corporate matters and events, time-stamping of
relevant documents, increased certainty and traceability of corporate actions,
and integrity of accounting records.176 As a result, they are likely to
downgrade management’s intermediary function and encourage more direct
interaction and communication among shareholders and between
shareholders and the corporation. Different corporate departments could, for
instance, give the shareholders direct access to relevant documents, and
shareholder petitions, proposals, proxies and other communications could
also be forwarded through blockchains, ensuring parity of information to all
authorized participants without the need for management’s mediation.
Corporate management is, however, still likely to maintain an
intermediary function for two reasons. First, management intervention is
needed to verify that shareholders only access the platform for lawful
purposes and communications, as well as to ensure the accuracy and
comprehensiveness of corporate information made available through the
blockchain. There might still be some justification for having management
establish whether shared information originating from within the corporation
contains relevant, comprehensive, and truthful data. Second, even if it
becomes feasible to grant broad access to corporate documents and
information without the risk of tampering, hacking, or other manipulation, it
might not be desirable or sensible. There is, for example, an enduring need
for having management filter confidential corporate information, news, or
documents that, if made public, could harm the company’s interests.177 Most
importantly, indiscriminate access to all corporate documents, even if not
strictly confidential, could hamper the day-to-day management of the
corporation and create excessive hurdles for directors and officers.
The most likely advantage of using blockchains and smart contracts to
circle information will thus not so much concern the scope or breadth of the
disclosure, but rather its timeliness, integrity, and traceability and, to a
greater extent, the increased ability of shareholders to share proposals,
petitions, and similar communications in a more direct fashion, limiting
corporate directors’ and officers’ advantage of advance consideration.

176.
177.

See supra Part I.D.
See Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 34–35.
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2. Direct Shareholder Monitoring and the False Promise of Board
Disintermediation
Blockchains and smart contracts are also likely to induce more active
shareholder monitoring of the conduct of senior management and other
company employees.178 If technology enables secure document transfers,
safe and traceable access to corporate records, and integrity and timestamping of relevant information, shareholders might demand to obtain more
direct knowledge of corporate affairs, relying less on the board’s
supervision. This might, in turn, foster shareholder activism and even
litigation.179 For example, blockchains and smart contracts could make
“executive compensation more easily traceable and quantifiable” for
investors,180 causing shareholders to challenge preexisting compensation
arrangements and practices more often than in the past.
Despite these changes, however, there is reason to doubt that
corporations will give up the board structure altogether or otherwise strip
boards of their monitoring role.181 Monitoring and policy-making activities
require time availability, which shareholders might not have, and frequent
engagement, which shareholders might not be willing to undertake.182 More
importantly, they also require business competence and skill, which
shareholders typically lack. It is no coincidence that directors’ expertise
usually mirrors corporate functions (e.g., accounting, compliance) or the
areas in which the company operates (e.g., financial services, oil and gas,
investments). This is because monitoring agents requires an expert
understanding of what the agents do and why they do it; absent such an
understanding, shareholders might not be fit for the task.
Technology will not fundamentally change this. Blockchains are not
useful for enhancing or providing expertise to those who don’t have it and,
to be sure, nor are big data and artificial intelligence. Blockchains may help
spread information and documents, but they certainly do not provide the
178. Cf. Assaf Hamdani et al., Technological Progress and the Future of the Corporation,
6(s1) J. BRIT. ACAD. 215, 217, 229–30 (2018) (pointing out that new technologies reduce
monitoring costs).
179. See Zetzsche, supra note 17, at 41 (observing that “[t]o the … extent that information,
communication, voting, and review become less expensive, we should expect shareholder
activism to rise.”).
180. Piazza, supra note 91, at 290. On the use of new technologies for executive
compensation arrangements, see Hamdani et al., supra note 178, at 217, 229; Enriques &
Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 11–12, 15.
181. See Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 33–42.
182. See id. at 35–37 (arguing that passive institutional investors will likely continue to
be rationally reticent).

4 - PICCIAU_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2021]

UNPREDITCABLE IMPACT

12/2/2020 1:00 PM

111

training or expertise that is often required to judge and act upon the
information contained in those documents. By the same token, big data and
artificial intelligence provide valuable information, advice, and
recommendations; however, these are still inputs that require competence to
be interpreted, understood, and utilized for decision-making purposes.
Artificial intelligence needs experts, or at least competent users, to express
its full potential. Consequently, while technology may enable more effective
monitoring, it cannot substitute the expertise that monitoring functions often
require. Making these instruments available to the shareholders does not
equate to providing them with the required knowledge, competence, and
expertise. We should thus expect that shareholders will continue to rely to a
significant extent on corporate boards for monitoring.
B. Shareholder Empowerment in Business Matters: Lessons from the
DAO Case
A second issue is whether new technologies will promote greater
shareholder involvement in business or even enable fully decentralized
organizations that function under a direct democracy principle—that is,
without executives or managers.183 As anticipated, shareholders typically
vote on control and structural decisions, while business decisions are left to
the board of directors and its agents. Twenty-first-century innovations,
however, facilitate virtual shareholder meetings, potentially leading to
shareholder empowerment in business.
Technology will foreseeably allow more frequent and engaged
shareholder voting by reducing the costs of collective decision-making.184
Thanks to improvements in cryptography, blockchains and smart contracts
provide a secure tool to share documents and information, trace share
transfers, identify who is entitled to participate and vote in shareholder
meetings, register proxies and votes, and check compliance with quorums
and majority requirements.185 To be sure, technology does not eliminate all
the costs inherent in assigning decision-making responsibilities to a collegial
body; factors such as the numerosity and heterogeneity of the preferences of
the body’s members are likewise crucial.186 Even if information
dissemination and voting procedures become more efficient, the risk (and
cost) of reaching inefficient decisions thus remains to some extent,
particularly for public companies with a large shareholder base. However, if
183.
184.
185.
186.

See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 137.
Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 17, at 176.
See supra Part I.D.
See HANSMANN, supra note 146, at 39–40.
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communication means and voting procedures are speedy and secure, they are
likely to be used more often. More voting opportunities could, in turn, entail
more power for the shareholders in business decisions.187 Even though the
tasks of shareholder meetings are ordinarily established by law, often
through mandatory provisions, contract law could introduce some
adjustments. The corporation’s governing documents could, for instance,
provide for enhanced powers to initiate or demand board action or establish
shareholder authorizations and advisory votes on business matters, without
this necessarily being a violation of corporate law mandatory provisions.188
For their part, directors and officers might even welcome greater shareholder
involvement in business decisions, using it as an argument in support of their
choices in case of liability risk. Even if these authorizations and votes were
not binding, one can indeed expect corporate management to pay attention
to them and conform its actions to their outcome, simply by way of moral
suasion.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that technology will tip the scales in favor
of empowering shareholders in business affairs. New technologies do very
little to alter shareholder incentives or to supplement or enhance shareholder
competence and skills, and this remains a powerful theoretical limit to
completely depriving directors and managers of their role.
The case of The Decentralized Autonomous Organization (The
DAO),189 which is often put forward to illustrate how direct shareholder
democracy could work in practice through technology,190 is instead a
powerful example of the shortcomings and limits of this idea.

187. See, e.g., DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 134 (arguing that “the cost of
soliciting shareholder input could decrease to the point where it would become economically
feasible for shareholders to assume a greater role in the management of organizations.”);
Yermack, supra note 23, at 23; Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 18.
188. Possible reforms concern the legal limits to shareholder influence that currently exist
in many jurisdictions, including procedural barriers to shareholder petitions or the provision
of a minimum share threshold to exercise shareholder rights, which have often been justified
by the cost of shareholder voting and engagement. See generally Zetzsche, supra note 17, at
40. However, these limits are likely to remain in some form, as they are typically also intended
to avoid obstructionist behaviors on the part of minority shareholders.
189. See, e.g., Werbach & Cornell, supra note 87, at 350–52; Fenwick & Vermeulen,
supra note 39, at 10. See generally DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 101–02, 136–55
(on decentralized organizations and The DAO).
190. See, e.g., Reyes, Geslevich Packin & Edwards, supra note 92, at 4–5 (defining The
DAO as a “leaderless, decentralized venture capital firm” that substituted “code for the
directors and officers,” and arguing, more generally, at 19, that “DLT [distributed ledger
technology] enables business governance structures that are more transparent, more flat, and
more participatory,” operating “without a centralized authority or agency.”).
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The DAO was an unincorporated organization run on blockchain
technology that ceased operations after having been the victim of a
cyberattack and being investigated in the United States by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) for violating public offering rules.191 Even
though blockchains are said to prevent cyberattacks and to produce
immutable records that cannot be modified at a later date, The DAO shows
that this statement is not absolute, but subject to exceptions under rare
circumstances.192 For our purposes, however, The DAO is an interesting
illustration of the extent to which new technologies can actually promote
greater investor empowerment (keeping in mind, however, that The DAO
did not adopt the corporate form and therefore, mandatory corporate law
provisions did not apply to it).
In 2016, The DAO sold a large amount of DAO tokens on the Ethereum
blockchain193 in exchange for a virtual currency named “Ether” for a total
value corresponding to approximately $150 million. The DAO was “pure
code,” managed by German corporation Slock.it. The founder and chief
technology officer of Slock.it described The DAO as a code programmed to
entirely “automate organizational governance and decision-making.”194
Significantly, The DAO’s website specified that the organization existed
“simultaneously nowhere and everywhere … operating solely with the
steadfast iron will of unstoppable code.”195 Essentially, The DAO raised
funds on a blockchain by receiving virtual currency in return for its tokens.
The organization’s main purpose was to invest these funds in projects
brought by contractors. Investors holding DAO tokens were entitled to vote
on the contract proposals and shared the “rewards” if the projects were
profitable. All voting procedures and corporate governance arrangements
were written into code and automated using smart contract technology.196

191. A description of The DAO and the results of the investigation are set out in an SEC
report. Report of Investigation, Exchange Act Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017).
192. For a description of the cyberattack and of the following events, when participants
in the blockchain managed to “reverse” the hack and obtain the stolen cryptocurrencies back,
see, e.g., id. at 9–10.
193. On the Ethereum blockchain, see, e.g., DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 27–29.
194. Christoph Jentzsch, Decentralized Autonomous Organization to Automate
Governance Final Draft—Under Review 1, https://lawofthelevel.lexblogplatformthree.
com/wp-content/uploads/sites/187/2017/07/WhitePaper-1.pdf (last accessed July 4, 2020).
195. Since The DAO’s website is no longer available, the quoted sentence is taken from
the report of the SEC, which mentions the content of the website. SEC Release No. 81207,
supra note 191, at 5.
196. Id. at 4–6.
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Interestingly, The DAO’s website included a messaging platform where
invited participants could discuss the organization among themselves.197
Contractors could submit project proposals to the organization by writing a
smart contract, the details of which were published on the blockchain. They
usually also provided additional information on their proposal on The
DAO’s website. The funds raised by The DAO were used to fund the
contractors’ proposals, provided that they obtained a majority of the votes of
DAO token holders. As ordinarily happens for business organizations, the
vote of each participant was weighed against the total number of tokens held,
in order to ensure proportionality. Not all proposals, however, were put to a
vote. A group of people chosen by Slock.it, known as the “curators,” were
in charge of reviewing the proposals and selecting those that were promising
enough to be voted upon. The curators also performed a more general
security function, checking, for example, whether the project proposals came
from identifiable sources and whether their smart contracts were properly
written, which proved important when The DAO came under attack.198
During the attack, funds were drained from the organization’s Ethereum
blockchain address to another address in the same blockchain belonging to
the hacker. The organization’s code managed to freeze the amount deposited
in that account for a certain number of days, during which the investors and
the curators rewrote the software detailing the rules of the blockchain (the
“Ethereum protocol”) and transferred the stolen Ethers to a recovery
address.199
Due perhaps to the attention that the cyberattack brought upon The
DAO, the SEC initiated an investigation, which ascertained that the DAO
tokens were securities and that, as a result, the organization should have
registered them before offering them to the public, absent an applicable
exemption.200 Among the factors that the SEC considered in making the
197. Id. at 5.
198. On how project proposals were selected and put to a vote and on the role of the
curators, see id. at 6–8.
199. Id. at 9. Essentially, the curators and the investors enforced a “hard fork,” which
happens when a majority of participants in a blockchain change the protocol without the
consent of all members. This gives rise to a separate chain of blocks, regulated by a different
protocol, that shares with the original blockchain some blocks but splits after a certain point
in order to enforce new rules. The fork is “hard” when the new rules of the blockchain, and
thus the new path taken by it, are incompatible with the original ones. In The DAO case, the
hard fork transferred the funds originally raised by the organization, including the stolen ones,
to a recovery address. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 24, 188–89 (defining forks
as the split of a blockchain in multiple copies due to different causes, and describing The
DAO’s hard fork); Reyes, Geslevich Packin & Edwards, supra note 92, at 6–7 (also on The
DAO’s hard fork).
200. SEC Release No. 81207, supra note 191, at 16.
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determination,201 special attention was given to the significant role assigned
to Slock.it and the curators in running the organization. Despite the claim
that The DAO was managed entirely by code and in a completely automated
fashion, the curators’ efforts were deemed essential to the success of the
enterprise. Not only did they decide which proposals were put to an investor
vote (this included proposals to remove the curators from their office), but
they also vetted contractors, presented themselves as experts, and helped
investors recover from the cyberattack.202 In short, even though investors had
the final say on the investments that the organization made, the curators
behaved and acted as managers, in an entity that resembled in many respects
an investment fund run by a management team.
The continued need for a management team by an organization that was
purportedly operated “solely with the steadfast iron will of unstoppable
code” is particularly significant in understanding the impact of twenty-firstcentury technologies on corporate governance. It shows that, in all
likelihood, shareholders will continue to expect a professional managerial
body to undertake some management functions and that direct shareholder
democracy is far from becoming a reality.
Besides mandatory corporate law constraints, one reason for this is that
shareholders might still not have sufficient time or the desire to decide on all
(business) matters,203 preferring to be in charge only of certain important
decisions. In fact, while The DAO’s investors held the ultimate
responsibility for all investment decisions, they benefited from the vetting
and prescreening activity performed by the curators, which permitted them
to focus exclusively on the most deserving projects.
Another perhaps more compelling reason is that technology does not
help much in providing business competence and skills to those who don’t
have them.204 It can solely help them obtain information, which is not quite
the same thing. The DAO case was peculiar in this respect: The distinction
between investment and business skills was not that relevant, because the
201. The SEC applied the “Howey test,” established by the Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J.
Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) in order to determine whether a contract is an investment
contract and thus a security under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. According to
the test, a contract is an investment contract if it concerns: (i) an investment of money; (ii) in
a common enterprise; (iii) in expectation of profits; (iv) solely from the efforts of a third party.
The last element of the test underscores that, in order to qualify as an investment contract (and
thus as a security), the investment’s returns must depend on the managerial efforts of a third
party.
202. SEC Release No. 81207, supra note 191, at 12–13.
203. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 139–40. See also Reyes, Geslevich
Packin & Edwards, supra note 92, at 26–27.
204. But cf. Zetzsche, supra note 17, at 42.
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business decisions that The DAO had to make were, in essence, investment
decisions—that is, whether or not to put money in a certain project. This
circumstance alone allowed greater investor empowerment than what could
be expected in other scenarios. Indeed, since business and investment
decisions almost coincided, The DAO’s investors generally had the skills to
make (all) business decisions. This is not usually the case, though. In a
corporate setting, even though shareholders may demand greater
involvement in business matters, they are still likely to opt for some form of
delegated management. After all, as The DAO and the investment fund
industry show, even when business decisions entail investment skills, a
managerial team may serve a useful purpose.
This conclusion can be theoretically explained and understood by
resorting to principal-cost theory.205 Recall that both principals and agents
incur competence and conflict costs when exercising control and that optimal
governance requires minimizing the sum of all control costs. Competence
costs are the costs of honest mistakes due to lack of expertise, skill, or talent.
Meanwhile, conflict costs result from self-seeking behaviors and from
monitoring efforts that are put in place to limit or prevent such conduct.206
Principal costs are the main reason that management is usually delegated.
They also reveal why investors will continue to “delegate control instead of
sharing it collectively,”207 even in the blockchain era. Under normal
circumstances, shareholders will not be able to competently (or cost
efficiently) run the business and will hire professional managers instead.
Even when investors have the competence and skill to make business
decisions, because they overlap with investment decisions as in The DAO
case or for other reasons (and thus principal competence costs are low or
zero), delegating some decision-making responsibilities to a professional
body might, however, still reduce total control costs. Think of the curators’
pre-screening activity of potential investments. Delegating control to the
curators presumably cut down the DAO token holders’ conflict costs—
namely, the costs of self-seeking behaviors and conflicts that may arise
among investors due to the heterogeneity of their preferences.208 Thus, one

205. Goshen & Squire, supra note 24.
206. Id. at 784.
207. Id. at 781. Significantly, when principals are numerous, principal competence costs
tend to be higher because any effort made by each principal to make an informed contribution
to collective decision-making will most likely be duplicative. See id. at 788.
208. See id. at 791–93. Principal conflict costs seem to largely, if not entirely, overlap
with the costs that in this article have been identified as collective decision-making costs.
According to Goshen and Squire, principal conflict costs are one of the main reasons why
corporations functioning under a direct democracy principle are never found among widely
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can very well expect professional management teams to run the business in
whole or in part even when shareholders make a sophisticated and skilled
group of potential managers.209
It could still be argued that The DAO only proves that executives and
managers will continue to be needed, but not that the board will necessarily
survive or preserve its role, provided that in The DAO’s organization, the
management function was performed by a single body, the curators, and not
by the usual two-tiered structure of a monitoring board overseeing
management. This apparently unique organizational feature follows,
however, from the ordinary separation of funds and managers that we
typically witness in investment funds,210 whereby even if the fund has chosen
an organizational form that does require a board of directors, the board has
in any case a very limited role.211 The absence in The DAO of a board can
hence be understood first and foremost by looking at the specific business
(i.e., investment) that the organization undertook. It can also be explained
considering that The DAO’s investors had unusual competence and skill to
evaluate the organization’s business decisions and were thus able to perform
with a higher than ordinary degree of expertise the monitoring function that
is normally entrusted to the board. This, however, is not usually the case.
Shareholders typically do not have the time and desire to engage in
monitoring, nor they have the competence. Despite allegations to the
contrary, neither directors nor officers are thus going to disappear.212
held firms. See also id. at 797–98. Interestingly, a direct democracy corporation would
resemble The DAO in many, if not all, respects.
209. It remains true, however, that “investors who are knowledgeable about business
matters will typically delegate less control to managers than those who are uninformed.” Id.
at 789.
210. See John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment
Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2014).
211. The board structure is required for mutual funds by the Investment Company Act but
the board’s monitoring role on behalf of the shareholders is rendered in practice almost
irrelevant by the lack of shareholder activism and the fact that directors can “serve indefinitely
without reelection” and “appoint many of their own replacements.” Id. at 1252. Hedge funds
cannot fire the management company and often choose organizational forms that do not even
mandate a board. Id. at 1232, 1253 (noting, at 1253, that “[t]o the extent that funds do have
directors, it is typically because quirks of law in offshore jurisdictions require it.”). See also
id. at 1255 (regarding private equity funds). See also id. at 1269–70 (with respect to closedend funds).
212. See Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 23–42 (challenging the view that
corporate boards are going to become obsolete). See also Petrin, supra note 113, at 1025–29
(providing an account of the view according to which decentralized organizations could make
managers obsolete, but concluding, at 1028–29, that “[c]urrently, it seems more likely that
technology will revolutionize and improve corporate management rather than lead to its
demise.”).

4 - PICCIAU_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

118

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

12/2/2020 1:00 PM

[Vol. 17:1

Whether or not running a particular business requires mostly business
skills or investment skills will tip the balance toward more or less
shareholder empowerment and monitoring in the specific case—provided,
however, that substantial modifications to the fundamental distribution of
powers between shareholders, directors, and managers are generally
unlikely. Adjustments may be introduced in the corporation’s governing
documents, and reforms aimed at accommodating technological innovations
may allow greater party autonomy in this respect. In such cases, this article
suggests that the distinction between decisions that mostly involve business
skills and decisions that mostly involve investment skills is a convenient
place to draw the line.
C. Corporate Management in the Twenty-First Century: A New
Balance Between Strategic, Supervisory, and Executive Roles
While blockchains and smart contracts might help modernize
shareholder meetings, artificial intelligence and algorithms entail greater
changes for managerial bodies.213 Recent examples of machine learning
algorithms that provide recommendations and make decisions, such as
VITAL or Watson, suggest that humans might not have a monopoly on
managerial functions anymore. However, fully autonomous algorithmic
entities or even fully algorithmic boards seem a more distant reality.
Current artificial intelligence programs are still far from exhibiting the
“general human-level intelligence” or “artificial general intelligence”214 that
would enable them to adjust their decision-making processes to changing
circumstances and to apply their “cognition” to a variety of different settings
and contexts, as humans do. Moreover, the large amounts of relevant data
that are necessary to run machine learning algorithms are not always
available, and when they are, there is often a trade-off between access to
wide public datasets and their meaningfulness and suitability for firmspecific issues and decisions.215 This considerably restricts the number of
firms that can effectively employ artificial intelligence for decision-making
purposes, as well as the type of issues that can be tackled through automated
decisions. Some companies may not have the resources to internally develop
adequate technological tools, and when they use public data or buy them
from third parties, they might not be able to put together appropriate inputs
to run machine learning algorithms on idiosyncratic matters of the firm.216
213.
214.
215.
216.

See Möslein, supra note 21, at 656–57.
See, e.g., Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 89–90, 96.
Id. at 97–99.
Id.
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These challenges make it hard to believe that fully autonomous boards
or algorithmic entities will spread anytime soon, even in jurisdictions that
seem to permit them already.217 In many other jurisdictions, there is the
additional obstacle of statutory provisions that require the appointment of a
board of directors comprising (natural) persons.218 Reforms are unlikely to
be undertaken in this respect, at least until policy considerations regarding
deterrence and accountability have been convincingly addressed for
algorithmic management systems as well.
1. Managerial Accountability in the Era of Artificial Intelligence
Machine learning algorithms and other artificial intelligence tools do
not respond to common incentives, only to programming instructions.
Current systems of incentives and deterrence, which are tailored to human
decision-makers, do not apply to algorithms.219 Significantly, broad
standards of conduct, such as the notions of “diligence,” “due care,” or
“loyalty,” are not intelligible for algorithms and cannot even be coded into
programming language. These standards, and the liability rules that are built
upon them, are inevitably made for human decision-makers. One can hardly
see, for instance, how the business judgment rule—which protects directors
and officers from second-guessing their business choices if they were not
interested in the transaction, they were duly informed, and they exercised
their judgment in the good faith effort to advance the corporation’s
interests—could apply to artificial intelligence alone.220 Artificial
intelligence may be unbiased and uninterested, but this actually depends on
coding and programming instructions. The same is true with respect to the
availability of the information that is necessary to make such decisions.
Again, whether the algorithm is duly informed (i.e., it is working on the
proper dataset for the task) depends on a programming choice. Finally,
artificial intelligence cannot make any “good faith” effort to advance
anyone’s interests.221 The very notion of good faith does not really make
sense for algorithms. At most, it does for the flesh-and-blood people who
programmed or ran the algorithm. This is because algorithms need well-

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See supra Part I.E and accompanying notes.
See, e.g., Möslein, supra note 21, at 664–65.
See id. at 651, 666–67.
See Petrin, supra note 113, at 1016.
See Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 108.
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defined and specific functioning rules, not broad standards potentially
subject to different interpretations.222
Strictly speaking, algorithms cannot even be held accountable if they
provide bad recommendations or make wrong decisions.223 They cannot pay
damages or make amends. Instead, legal entities (such as the company
producing or using the algorithm) and the people running them are needed
to enforce any liquidation of damages.224 As a result, human decision-makers
continue to provide crucial accountability when it comes to employing
technology for managerial purposes, which the law will not easily abandon
without valid alternatives.
2. The Impact of Technology on Organizational Charts and on the Role
of the Board
The impact of artificial intelligence on high-level managerial functions
may then be better appreciated considering that it will most likely
complement, rather than substitute, corporate directors and officers. Besides
accountability, the reason is that most of the tasks that corporate executives
and directors carry out which often involve situational judgment, flexibility,
adaptability, and communication skills are not readily replicable by
222. Cf. Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 695
(2017). A similar point has been raised with respect to algorithmic management and the
pursuit of corporate purposes. Algorithms “optimize a given goal function” and they do so
incredibly effectively. The use of artificial intelligence in decision-making thus “carries the
risk that extremely one-sided goals will be pursued with utmost effectiveness.” Armour &
Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 108–09. Significantly, algorithms do not work well with the
broad corporate goals or purposes that often guide managerial decisions today, which may
require the balancing of different considerations and interests. Corporate goals must instead
be somehow quantifiable and measurable in terms of outcome variables. This in turn “may
exacerbate a more general tendency to focus excessively on factors it is possible to quantify
such as stock prices.” Id. at 101. See also Petrin, supra note 113, at 1020–22 (arguing that,
unlike human managers, artificial intelligence could work toward more than one goal at the
same time).
223. See Gramitto Ricci, supra note 16, passim.
224. The problem of accountability becomes immediately apparent if one thinks of a fully
autonomous algorithmic entity with no human decision-makers and possibly no human
members (see supra Part I.E). Managerial liability or piercing the corporate veil would not be
an option and the only way to recover damages would necessarily depend upon whether the
self-driving corporation actually had sufficient assets on its own to ensure damage
compensation. Several solutions have been discussed, such as registration or capital
requirements, imposing liability on artificial intelligence providers or strict liability on
corporations that make use of artificial intelligence, mandatory insurance, etc. On all of these
aspects, see Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 107–08, 110–13. See also Petrin,
supra note 113, at 1013–18.

4 - PICCIAU_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2021]

UNPREDITCABLE IMPACT

12/2/2020 1:00 PM

121

computers.225 With this in mind, one can expect that algorithms will
streamline and simplify decision-making structures and apparatuses to a
considerable extent but not entirely automate them, at least for the majority
of firms.
Directors and officers make decisions after company employees
perform complex inquiries and fact-finding activities, which often involve
information gathering and processing, as well as advice from external
experts, advisors, and counsel. It is precisely in relation to these inquiries,
preliminary investigations, and advisory services that artificial intelligence
can provide its greatest contribution.226 Artificial intelligence can offer
valuable informative support by analyzing large amounts of data, finding
correlations and patterns in the datasets, and identifying profitable business
strategies and solutions. It may be argued, though, that this is not a new
discovery at all. The consequences for corporations may, however, be
profound. Not only might demand for external advisory services diminish,
but the number of company employees dedicated to these preliminary
activities might drop.227 Automation of these operating tasks suggests that
some lower-level managers and employees might disappear from future
organizational charts, leaving a good deal of work to the machines.228
Competences that have commonly been delegated to executive officers
and managers because of the need for particular operating expertise might
225. Corporate directors and officers perform, in fact, a variety of cognitive nonroutine
tasks, involving situational judgment, problem-solving skills, complex communications,
flexibility and creativity, which cannot be translated into a comprehensive and exhaustive set
of rules to be coded in a computer software. With respect to both cognitive and manual
nonroutine tasks, computers typically complement, rather than substitute, human labor. See
David H. Autor, Frank Levy & Richard J. Murnane, The Skill Content of Recent
Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1279 (2003) (drawing the
distinction between routine and nonroutine tasks and showing that computers can more easily
substitute workers that carry out the first, but instead typically complement workers that
mostly perform the second).
226. Information gathering and processing generally involve routine tasks and are, in fact,
easier to automate. See Autor, Levy & Murnane, supra note 225, at 1284–85. See also Autor,
supra note 62, at 143; Agrawal, Gans & Goldfarb, supra note 6, at 16.
227. See generally Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 90, 103 (observing that the
use of artificial intelligence will likely mean that fewer people are needed to perform the same
tasks, that new decisions will become important, and that agency costs will increasingly relate
to fewer strategic areas).
228. See supra notes 221 and 225. See also Petrin, supra note 113, at 971–72, 980, 983–
96 (distinguishing between administrative managerial tasks and non-administrative judgment
work, and arguing that the former is more susceptible to be completely taken over by artificial
intelligence, but that in the future even the latter might be performed to some extent by
technology). But see Rogers, supra note 5, at 553–54 (arguing that automation mostly
concerns tasks, not full jobs).

4 - PICCIAU_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

122

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

12/2/2020 1:00 PM

[Vol. 17:1

also be automated or shift back to the board of directors (or to inside
directors), due to the informational decision-making support provided by
technological tools.229 Directors might be more willing to undertake some
higher-level operating responsibilities too, if they can easily obtain the
advice and information necessary for the task, and the time and effort that it
entails are cut down by automation.
To be sure, modern boards are mostly made up of independent directors
who monitor by relying on the information flows put in place by company
executives and especially on increased firm-specific public disclosure and
market prices.230 They are thus not necessarily more knowledgeable than
investors when it comes to firm-specific information.231 However, with the
additional data, advice, and support provided by artificial intelligence they
could become more involved in strategic and operating decisions. Greater
availability of decision-making tools not only strengthens the decisionmaking role of executive board members, to the detriment of lower-level
company employees, but it also enables the board as a whole to embrace new
responsibilities. Compared to shareholders, outside independent directors
retain, after all, the advantage of greater expertise and more frequent
interaction with senior management. This makes it easy to predict greater
board involvement in company policies and strategies and perhaps even in
important operating decisions. Changes in board composition to recruit
directors with greater expertise in business or strategic planning might
follow suit.232

229. A conceptually similar prediction has been advanced by Martin Petrin, according to
whom artificial intelligence will likely lead to “fused management”: the abolishment of the
prevailing two-tiered structure of corporate governance (whereby the board supervises
delegated officers and managers) in favor of an all-encompassing management body,
combining functions and tasks that are currently performed by the board and by managers.
See Petrin, supra note 113, at 1006–08.
230. See Gordon, supra note 133, at 1473–1500, 1541–63.
231. Evidence shows, however, that they are generally more knowledgeable than
investors, provided that when they trade on the company’s stock, they typically outperform
the market. See Enrichetta Ravina & Paola Sapienza, What Do Independent Directors Know?
Evidence from Their Trading, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 962 (2010).
232. See Hamdani et al., supra note 178, at 230. On the need to adapt board composition
and director competence to the opportunities and challenges opened up by technology, see
Niccolò Abriani, La corporate governance nell’era dell’algoritmo. Prolegomeni a uno studio
sull’impatto dell’intelligenza artificiale sulla corporate governance, 2020 IL NUOVO DIRITTO
DELLE SOCIETÀ 261, 272–74 (predicting that, in the future, corporate boards could have fewer,
more business-oriented members).
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a. The Gig Economy, the Changing Role of Production Workers, and
the Disappearance of Middle Managers
While artificial intelligence will likely strengthen the highest levels of
the organizational chart, the case of middle-level and line-level workers is
partly different. Different technologies come in to play, which do not
necessarily involve data processing through artificial intelligence, but rather
pure algorithmic supervision, management, and control. Algorithms can, in
fact, also be used to monitor, organize, and handle internal processes of the
firm.233 For instance, they may be employed to keep track of inventory
material, handle customers’ orders, organize workers’ schedules, provide
instructions to workers on how to perform their jobs, hire and lay off
workers, and so forth. Robots equipped with sophisticated software may
even physically execute some of these tasks, including moving items inside
a warehouse or giving customers their change back. Some of these
technologies affecting the workforce have already been adopted in large
corporate organizations. The observed result is a contraction in the number
of certain low- and middle-skilled workers, whose jobs can be performed
quite well by technology.234 As innovations advance, these effects may move
up the ladder and affect higher-skilled workers as well.235 The ongoing
technological improvements thus raise the more general question of the
actual extent of technologically induced corporate reorganization processes.
Just as not all cognitive and decision-making functions that corporate
directors and officers perform can be fully substituted by technology, not all
manual tasks can be effectively automated.236 There is still room for workers
233. See generally Sarah O’Connor, When your boss is an algorithm, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 8,
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/88fdc58e-754f-11e6-b60a-de4532d5ea35.
234. See, e.g., John Armour et al., Putting technology to good use for society: the role of
corporate, competition and tax law, 6 J. BRIT. ACAD. 285, 305 (2018).
235. See generally Autor, supra note 62, at 149 (observing that “the occupations that are
losing share appear to be increasingly drawn from higher ranks of the occupational
distribution.”). See also Petrin, supra note 113, at 1002–03 (predicting that technological
development will lead to “fused boards” with fewer members, since artificial intelligence will
perform the role previously attributed to some of them).
236. More specifically, only routine manual tasks, which can be deterministically
specified in a precise and unambiguous set of rules (e.g., moving an object from one side of
a room to the other), are easy to automate through computers. The same is true for routine
cognitive tasks (e.g., making calculations), which can also be easily automated. By contrast,
nonroutine tasks, which include both manual and cognitive activities that humans can perform
but whose rules are not sufficiently well understood to be specified in explicit terms, are much
more resistant to automation. Examples of these activities include cooking, serving food, and
personal care assistance, which may require complex communication abilities, situational
judgment and problem-solving skills, as well as manual dexterity. Autor, Levy & Murnane,
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who cook, operate storage systems, perform maintenance services or come
into contact with customers. Nevertheless, while in highly hierarchical
organizations with strong labor unions and job stability (like mid-twentieth
century corporations), every employee is partly a manager (in the sense that
she can program, administer and manage her own effort and work, including
training),237 this is no longer the case when algorithmic management systems
control workers’ hires, schedules and performance.238 Not only does this
technology make it is easier to automate some managerial tasks, but it also
makes it efficient to divest most production workers of the discretion they
had in administering their own skills. As a result, these workers are
increasingly confined to purely production roles.239
In some cases, algorithmic management systems not only reduce
workers’ discretion but go so far as to deprive them of their status as
employees, turning them into subcontractors. Provided that various
technologies enable firms to precisely measure, monitor, and supervise work
performance240 even at a distance and for complex activities, the boundary
between employees and independent contractors has often started to
disappear.241
The gig economy is a powerful example of both forces, as companies
in this realm were early adopters of algorithmic management techniques.
Indeed, the very expression gig economy refers to economic activities carried
out by employing a workforce that mostly performs “gigs,” “tasks,” and not
actual “work.”242 This is partly because workers are often split among
different jobs and thus devote to the “gig” only limited time,243 and partly
supra note 225; Autor, supra note 62; also cited by Rogers, supra note 5, at 554, 559–61 (also
providing examples of the shortcomings of robots at performing manual tasks).
237. Daniel Markovits, How McKinsey Destroyed the Middle Class, THE ATLANTIC (Feb.
3, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/how-mckinsey-destroyed-midd
le-class/605878/.
238. For the definition of algorithmic management, as used in this paragraph, see supra
note 110.
239. I am grateful to Daniel Markovits for these observations.
240. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 562–63 (describing various technologies that enable
companies to measure and quantify different aspects of work, process the collected data, and
base managerial decisions upon them).
241. See, e.g., id. at 549–50, 569–73 (discussing and providing examples of technologyenabled fissuring).
242. See Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the Just-in-Time Workforce: On-Demand Work,
Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the Gig-Economy, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471,
477–78 (2016).
243. For example, according to a survey, in 2014 and 2015 most Uber drivers had other
jobs in addition to partnering with Uber. More specifically, in 2014, about 31% of the polled
drivers worked full time at another job, 30% had another part-time job in addition to
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because even full-time workers typically repeat the same tasks and
assignments (the same “gigs”) over and over again. Famous examples of gig
economy companies are Amazon, Uber, and Deliveroo. With some
necessary distinctions, all of these companies use algorithms, platforms,
apps, location trackers, scanners, and other technologies to manage and
monitor their workforce.
Amazon uses algorithms, sensors, and other technologies to monitor
warehouse employees in many different respects. The company patented the
technology for a wristband that, if implemented, would allow even stricter
monitoring on workers, including, for instance, how employees carry out
specific tasks, when they take breaks, how long the break is, how they place
and move items within the warehouse, and so forth.244 Significantly, Amazon
also sponsored a contest for robots to pick items off of warehouse shelves,
but since humans still appear to be better at the task, the company limited
itself to using robots that bring the shelves to the employee instead of
employing fully robotic arms.245
Uber uses an algorithm to match drivers with customers.246 Drivers use
their app to signal availability, accept rides, and obtain payment. The app
suggests to the driver the preferred route to the destination and enables Uber
to monitor the driver’s performance. If the driver receives low customer
ratings, refuses too many rides, or underperforms in other respects, Uber can
simply refuse the driver access to the platform.
Similarly, Deliveroo uses an algorithm to handle riders’ schedules and
match each rider to a set of deliveries or a geographic area. Algorithms and
apps enable the company to monitor the riders’ performance, including how
many deliveries they complete, how long each delivery took, whether it was
partnering with Uber, and roughly 38% worked for the company full time. By 2015, these
percentages had changed to 52% (drivers working full time at another job), 14% (drivers
working part time at another job), 33% (drivers working full time for Uber). Jonathan V. Hall
& Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United
States 10, 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22843, 2016), https://
www.nber.org/papers/w22843.pdf.
244. Ceylan Yeginsu, If Workers Slack Off, the Wristband Will Know. (And Amazon Has
a Patent for It.), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/
technology/amazon-wristband-tracking-privacy.html.
245. Noam Scheiber, Inside an Amazon Warehouse, Robots’ Ways Rub Off on Humans,
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/business/economy/ama
zon-warehouse-labor-robots.html (describing the operation of Amazon’s Staten Island
warehouse); Jason Del Rey, How robots are transforming Amazon warehouse jobs—for better
and worse, VOX (Dec. 11, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/12/11/
20982652/robots-amazon-warehouse-jobs-automation.
246. See Lee et al., supra note 110 (discussing the main features of the algorithmic
management systems employed by Uber and Lyft to provide ride-sharing services).
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concluded within the estimated time frame, whether the rider refused
deliveries, and so on.247
In many cases, an immediately noticeable consequence of the use of
these technologies is the rearrangement of the workforce between employees
and independent contractors. Gig economy companies tend not to employ
their workers but to rely on a wide network of independent contractors248
who formally retain the power to decide when and how to work, such as
whether to accept a ride or a delivery, but are in practice monitored,
controlled, and directed as if they were employees.249 This phenomenon is
known as “fissuring.”250 While fissuring also includes cases in which firms
actually externalize functions to subcontractors or franchisees, it has brought
about pressing calls for labor law reform when it involves a misclassification
of employees as independent contractors, as often happens in the gig
economy.251
Another noteworthy consequence is that these companies enable a
modern form of “Taylorism”252 by breaking down complex activities into
different tasks that can either be automated or allocated to low-skilled labor
and often try to control working environments such as Amazon’s warehouses
in order to reduce the need for human flexibility and adaptability.253 This has
progressively led to the downsizing, if not disappearance, of middle-class
workers.254 To be sure, other forces are at play in scaling back the role of
middle-class workers within corporate organizations,255 but technology is
speeding up the process as workers no longer enjoy discretion on how to
perform their tasks. Technology has increased the distance between actual
managers and production workers in the content of their assignments. Fewer
managers manage, with the help of technology.256 The rest perform simple,
repetitive tasks. The work is broken down into a collection of different gigs,
which enables greater standardization and the adoption of internal

247.
248.
249.
250.

O’Connor, supra note 233.
E.g., De Stefano, supra note 242, at 478.
Id. at 491–92, 498.
See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO
BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014).
251. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 5, at 569–70, 578.
252. See id. at 541, 553 (on “digital Taylorism”). See also O’Connor, supra note 233.
253. Autor, supra note 62, at 155–58.
254. See id. at 134–42 (showing that computerization of routine jobs has contributed to
employment polarization in the United States).
255. Cf., e.g., Markovits, supra note 237.
256. See Lee et al., supra note 110, at 1603 (observing, with respect to ride-sharing
services such as Uber and Lyft, that “[a]lgorithmic management allows a few human
managers in each city to oversee hundreds and thousands of drivers on a global scale.”).
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procedures and rules aimed at making humans and machines work together
in a more coordinated fashion.
Among middle-class workers, the contraction of middle managers is
probably the most pronounced effect. As the examples of Uber and
Deliveroo show, in the gig economy algorithms essentially perform, with
limited or no human supervision, two purely managerial functions that have
been historically attributed to middle management:257 (i) hiring and layoff
decisions, as well as workers’ schedules;258 and (ii) monitoring workers’
performance.259 With the spread of these technologies, we can also expect a
contraction of middle management in companies that operate in a more
“traditional” way. This will have significant implications for corporate law
and governance. Fewer upper-level managers and executives can directly
manage and monitor a greater fraction of the workforce and will be
increasingly called upon to make pivotal decisions. As decision-making
power becomes more concentrated, responsibility and salary260 follow,261
indicating that human decision-makers must pay close attention to
organizational and technological adequacy, information flows, and internal
monitoring systems.
3. New (Strategic) Choices for Directors and Managers
The extent of these technologically induced changes will be largely
determined by how directors and executives, in their respective roles, will
tackle certain emerging tech-governance issues,262 including those that some
scholars have named “CorpTech governance”263 or “data governance.”264
These involve, first and foremost, the fundamental choice of whether the
company should rely on technology and to what extent, as well as the
challenge of adapting the company’s business model to the opportunities and

257. Cf. Rogers, supra note 5, at 563 (observing that the tasks that algorithmic
management systems automate are mostly managerial, such as “screening of resumés,
inventory tracking and ordering, scheduling, workflow organization, oversight, payroll
processing, etc.”).
258. See id. at 564–67 (discussing algorithmic hiring and scheduling).
259. See id. at 567–69 (discussing algorithmic monitoring and tasking).
260. On the rising incomes of highly skilled workers, including company executives, see
Autor, supra note 62, at 142–44; Markovits, supra note 237.
261. Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 90–91, 103–04.
262. Technology and IT have traditionally fallen within the remit of officers and
managers, but board involvement is gaining traction. Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at
44–45.
263. See id. passim.
264. See Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 90–91, 99–105.
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possibilities opened up by technology. Some commentators have advocated
for radical changes in corporate governance, such as the abandonment of
hierarchical organizational structures in favor of a shift toward platform
governance265 or an “ecosystem” model of organization.266 Radical
upheavals of corporate governance models seem unlikely to become
widespread, especially outside of the technology sector or the “platform
business.”267 Nevertheless, all companies could, to a greater or lesser extent,
adjust their business models to make use of blockchains and smart contracts
or take advantage of big data and artificial intelligence applications.
BMW is an interesting example in this regard. Despite its complex,
hierarchical organizational structure, it not only embeds new technologies in
its cars, but it also uses big data analytics and artificial intelligence for many
purposes, including the design, engineering, and production of its vehicles
and consumer support services.268 Variations can be expected across firms
and industries, but embracing technology is becoming increasingly a matter
of survival for companies.
Most likely, then, the main organizational choice will actually be which
corporate functions or jobs should be enhanced or assisted by technology and
how this should happen, with possible repercussions on workforce
distribution. For corporate executives, however, the key decision will likely
concern whether to use artificial intelligence at all and, if so, how to put
together sufficiently large sets of relevant data.
Data might be publicly available or bought by third parties but using
data analytics based on third-party technology may be helpful only for
general inquiries and not for idiosyncratic problems of the firm.269 The same
is true for machine learning and other artificially intelligent algorithms. The
technology is usually available for sale, but it generally does not target most
corporations’ specific needs. Corporate directors and managers will thus

265. See Fenwick, McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 30 (arguing that current corporate
governance models are failing businesses operating as platforms and suggesting a shift toward
“platform governance”).
266. Mark Fenwick & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The End of the Corporation 10-26
(European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Law Working Paper No. 482/2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3472601.
267. This includes technology firms such as Facebook or Amazon, whose core business
is to provide a platform that connects different users for different purposes. A possible
classification distinguishes, for instance, between social platforms (e.g., Facebook), exchange
platforms (e.g., Amazon), content platforms (e.g., YouTube), software platforms (e.g., Apple
iOS), and blockchain platforms (e.g., Ethereum). See Fenwick, McCahery & Vermeulen,
supra note 30, at 175, 177; Fenwick & Vermeulen, supra note 266, at 13.
268. Marr, supra note 12.
269. Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 97–99.

4 - PICCIAU_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2021]

UNPREDITCABLE IMPACT

12/2/2020 1:00 PM

129

have to decide whether it makes economic sense to buy algorithmic
technology and data or whether it is better to produce one or the other, or
even both, in house.270 In the latter case, proprietary algorithms running on
proprietary datasets might require a restructuring of the “data architecture”
of the firm—namely, ensuring that the company has in place adequate
procedures to make available to the corporation’s decision-making bodies
and their technological decision-making aids a large quantity of internal data
obtained from customers, suppliers, and so forth.271 Clearly, the judgment on
the opportunity and financial feasibility of such an investment rests with
corporate management, as does the responsibility for compliance with
privacy laws and regulations.
More generally, current organizational structures need to be adjusted to
identify where artificial intelligence and algorithms should be used, to
acquire from outside the firm the necessary expertise, to train employees and
managers, even at senior levels, and to provide incentives for the proper
deployment of technological aids.272
4. Tech Committees, Technological Risks, and Monitoring
Algorithmic decision-making is not without its hazards. Even though
algorithms are said to be impartial, unbiased, and not subject to distorted
incentives,273 they might produce unbalanced results in practice. To be sure,
when this happens it is usually because of biased instructions or data at the
outset.274 Nevertheless, these problems might be difficult to overcome.
Continuous monitoring and supervision of the activities performed in whole
or in part through artificial intelligence hence becomes critical to ensure
quality.

270. Cf. id. (also observing that the option of training artificial intelligence on proprietary
data is available especially to larger firms).
271. See id. at 99–100.
272. Id. at 101–03.
273. See, e.g., Hamdani et al., supra note 178, at 229. See generally Cass R. Sunstein,
Algorithms, Correcting Biases, 86 SOC. RES. 499 (2019) (showing that algorithms can actually
help correct human biases).
274. See, e.g., Surden, supra note 60, at 105–07 (discussing the limitations of machine
learning programs); Kroll et al., supra note 222, at 680–82 (providing examples of situations
in which algorithmic decision-making may produce biased, discriminatory, and unfair
results); Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 24–25, 30–31; Petrin, supra note 113, at
1005–06 (explaining that algorithms are vulnerable to programmers’ inherent biases).
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Monitoring the deployment of artificial intelligence falls under the
responsibility of directors and officers.275 When artificial intelligence
performs tasks that humans already do well, they have a duty to oversee the
result. Even in situations where outcomes are not clear or where artificial
intelligence performs tasks that humans are not able to do quite as well, such
as when algorithms provide advice and recommendations based on big data,
directors and officers maintain a duty to critically evaluate them. The focus
of the supervision shifts, however, more toward procedural aspects, such as
how the data were assembled or how the code was written.276
To accommodate these new monitoring functions, corporate directors
and officers might need to acquire greater technical knowledge and
expertise.277 According to some commentators, we will see the rise of “tech
committees” in charge of overseeing technological governance
arrangements.278 Importantly, tech committees may also be entrusted with
the task of evaluating and managing the technological risks posed by
innovation.279 Imagine a corporation that provides personalized financial
advice through a proprietary machine-learning algorithm developed in
house. Shortcomings in the algorithm’s coding or in the criteria to assemble
the data might expose the corporation to significant liability risks. The
identification, evaluation, monitoring, and management of those risks
requires special knowledge regarding how the algorithm works, how coding
instructions are or should be written, how the datasets have been put together,
and so forth. The board of directors should be qualified accordingly, through
its members or an ad hoc tech committee, and should ensure the presence

275. See Möslein, supra note 21, at 659–60; Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at
101–03; Petrin, supra note 113, at 1013–15.
276. Significantly, human contribution is still important to extract value from big data.
Big data analytics involves a multitude of activities on data—such as storage, extraction,
filtering, refining, organization, etc.—that are necessary to extract knowledge from them and
require expertise and competence. See MAGGIOLINO, supra note 7, at 37–43, 51 (also
observing that the results obtained through big data analytics may be critically evaluated and
tested). See generally Kroll et al., supra note 222 (discussing ways to make algorithmic
decision-making more accountable and reviewable ex post).
277. Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 102, 105, 115; Möslein, supra note 21, at
660.
278. See Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 45–47. See also Armour & Eindenmüller,
supra note 57, at 102–03, 115 (supporting the establishment of board committees dedicated
to data governance issues).
279. See Agrawal, Gans & Goldfarb, supra note 6, at 18–20 (providing examples of risks
posed by the use of artificial intelligence, including liability risks). Possible areas of oversight
include the conflicts of interest inherent in the use of technology for governance purposes.
With respect to these conflicts, see Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 31, 42.
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within the corporation of officers, managers, and other employees with the
necessary expertise.
This and other similar examples are not science fiction but have already
made the front pages of newspapers. IBM, for instance, came under the
spotlight when it was discovered that its Watson program for oncology,
which had been promoted to hospitals and physicians all over the world, was
giving erroneous cancer treatment advice280 and that it had been benched by
one of the hospitals that had been using it, the University of Texas MD
Anderson Cancer Center.281 Apparently, the program had been trained on a
limited dataset of hypothetical cases and not on real patients’ data; its
recommendations thus deviated from approved guidelines.282 Although no
patients were harmed by the incorrect therapeutic treatments suggested by
the program, this case sheds light on the need to maintain control over
artificial intelligence products and applications, as well as the liability risks
that the (mis)use of big data and artificial intelligence can create.
Significantly, these risks which often involve privacy considerations, have
given rise to dedicated corporate functions that check compliance with the
applicable laws and regulations.
5. Corporate Reporting, Compliance, and Information Flows
Monitoring of technological risks is key not only for those enterprises
whose business involves providing technological services, as in the
examples above, but also for corporations that offer non-technological goods
and services but still employ technology as a governance and management
tool.283
The board of directors is generally responsible for implementing
appropriate and effective governance practices, structures, and models.
Incorrect use of technological tools that is associated with, or determines,
organizational shortcomings ultimately falls under its purview when things
280. Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, IBM’s Watson supercomputer recommended ‘unsafe and
incorrect’ cancer treatments, internal documents show, STATNEWS (July 25, 2018), https://
www.statnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/IBMs-Watson-recommended-unsafe-andincorrect-cancer-treatments-STAT.pdf.
281. Matthew Herper, MD Anderson Benches IBM Watson In Setback For Artificial
Intelligence In Medicine, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2017, 3:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
matthewherper/2017/02/19/md-anderson-benches-ibm-watson-in-setback-for-artificial-intel
ligence-in-medicine/#400d26ae3774.
282. Ross & Swetlitz, supra note 280.
283. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and
Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669 (2010) (discussing technological compliance
and risk management systems and their possible shortcomings).
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go wrong. A significant example is the deployment of technology for
accounting and reporting purposes. Since corporate reporting is the
responsibility of directors and managers, if they decide to shift to blockchain
accounting, at least some of them should know how to operate blockchains
and smart contracts and how to oversee them, and they may be required to
obtain specific training for that purpose.284
The same is true when technology is used to automate corporate
procedures or as a tracking and monitoring device. Corporate management
retains the duty to ensure that automated tasks are performed properly and
that corporate processes driven by new technologies are able to raise warning
signs or circle anomalies when these happen. Ultimately, these and similar
responsibilities fall under the general duty of care with which corporate
directors and officers must comply at all times. The innovation, as a matter
of fact, is not that great.
A final observation is warranted regarding how technology might
enhance and strengthen directors’ monitoring role. Nonexecutive and
independent directors typically obtain information regarding corporate
affairs through reports and statements prepared by executive officers,285 who
may have a seat on the board or simply come to inform the board of their
activities.286 Direct access to corporate documents and information by nonexecutives is often impractical and may even disrupt corporate operations,287
especially if such access was unplanned. Accordingly, corporations rely on
information flows that from the lowest level of the organizational chart reach
the board of directors through company executives. The board’s dependence
on the information flows organized by management creates, however, a
number of problems, including the possibility that corporate management
presents the information in a biased or unduly favorable way or refrains from
providing information to avoid stricter monitoring.288 Technology may help
safeguard the need to ensure systematic and methodic controls without
disrupting or obstructing corporate operations by granting more direct access

284. Dai & Vasarhelyi, supra note 84, at 17.
285. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 138, at 143–44; MACEY, supra note 131, at 96;
Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 284.
286. At least some executive officers have a seat on the board, although the number of
executives also serving as directors has decreased over time. Compare EISENBERG, supra note
138, at 145 (writing, in 1976, that “a substantial number of seats are held by executives
themselves”), with MACEY, supra note 131, at 55 (observing, in 2008, that corporate insiders
have very few seats on the boards of U.S. companies). On such changes in board composition,
see Gordon, supra note 133, at 1472–76 (providing data on the rise of independent directors).
287. Cf. MACEY, supra note 131, at 96.
288. Id. at 56, 60–61; Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 284.
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to information to non-executive and independent directors.289 Advancements
in cryptography and the adoption of blockchains and smart contracts may
encourage direct access to corporate documents by people at different levels
of the organizational chart, including non-executive directors. This might
improve reporting systems and facilitate supervision, making board
members less dependent on the information flows received from company
executives and officers. The monitoring role of the board of directors may
thus be strengthened as a result.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Three main policy implications follow from this analysis. The first is
the need to preserve the ability of corporations to design their own tech
governance structures and to balance the allocation of powers between
different corporate constituencies accordingly. The potential benefits and
costs of using technology to empower different corporate constituencies vary
based on the idiosyncratic features of the firm. Therefore, the general
recommendation put forward by principal-cost theory to permit a range of
governance structures and refrain from direct regulation of the allocation of
control rights290 also remains valid in the context of technology-driven
corporate governance changes.291 For instance, the benefits that technologybased shareholder empowerment may bring for firms largely depend on the
number and competence of the shareholders and on the heterogeneity of their
preferences. While it might thus make sense to use blockchains and other
technologies to ensure shareholder involvement in business decisions when
shareholders have or may easily acquire the necessary expertise, as could be
the case for companies with large institutional shareholdings,292 the same
choice might be ill-advised in many other cases. This observation also
counsels against the adoption of one-size-fits-all technology-driven
corporate governance models that have been enthusiastically supported by
some commentators,293 such as a general shift toward a collaborative
289. Abriani, supra note 232, at 273. But see Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 32
(arguing that, “[s]o long as management retains control of the coding, data sources and
algorithms used for reporting to a board,” technology will not improve information flows).
290. Goshen & Squire, supra note 24, 825–26, 828.
291. See Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 47–48.
292. Generally speaking, greater engagement and “collaboration” on the part of
institutional investors could help firms acquire valuable expertise and knowledge. See Jill E.
Fisch & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration, 98 TEX. L. REV. 863 (2020) (arguing
that collaboration between insiders and institutional investors could be firm-value enhancing
by aggregating the partial and complementary information in their possession).
293. See supra notes 265 and 266 and accompanying text.
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“platform governance” structure. Platform governance might make sense for
some but certainly not for all corporate enterprises. Each firm should thus be
allowed to make distinctive choices with respect to technology and
governance.
There are, however, cases in which the adoption of new technologies
should at least be encouraged by lawmakers. I am referring, in particular, to
the use of blockchains and smart contracts to run virtual shareholder
meetings. In some U.S. states virtual shareholder meetings are prohibited by
provisions that require meetings to be held at a physical location.294 These
limits have been often justified by invoking the shortcomings of older
technologies, which do not quite provide a secure and effective forum for
virtual discussion, information sharing, and voting. Today, blockchains and
smart contracts nullify these limits, because they make it possible to almost
fully replicate physical meetings in a virtual setting and have the additional
advantage of solving some of the problems of traditional shareholder
meetings, such as difficulties in shareholder identification, eligibility to vote,
proxy issues, and vote counting. This leads to a second, narrower state law
policy recommendation, which is to allow virtual shareholder meetings and
remove all remaining regulatory barriers to that effect.
Finally, as new technologies can strengthen the role of directors and
officers and supplement management in numerous ways, corporations
should be nudged to effectively manage and monitor their technological risks
and opportunities—for instance, through establishing ad-hoc tech
committees of the board and training programs on the use of new technology
at the managerial level. As corporate law’s duty of care is a blunt weapon to
obtain this result, a promising way forward is to introduce disclosure
obligations on the internal tech governance arrangements adopted by
corporations.295 These obligations need not be burdensome for disclosing
companies, but could be crafted under a comply-or-explain approach,
whereby only companies that have made a significant investment in
technology for governance purposes would need to disclose which specific
organizational controls and procedures they have put in place to that end.

294. As of 2019, 30 U.S. states permitted virtual-only shareholder meetings, 12 other
states and the District of Columbia exclusively allowed hybrid meetings (meetings for which
remote participation is allowed in connection to a physical gathering), and 8 remaining states
required in-person meetings. See BROADRIDGE, VIRTUAL SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS. 2019
FACTS AND FIGURES 3 (2020), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-virtualshareholder-meetings-2019-facts-and-figures.pdf. Additional constraints to virtual-only
shareholder meetings may be set forth in company bylaws, even in states that explicitly allow
them.
295. Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 49–50.
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Such a disclosure obligation would enable greater public scrutiny on the use
of technology and ideally foster a race to the top toward virtuous governance
models.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Common predictions regarding the impact of new technologies on
corporations vary from forecasts of completely autonomous organizations
run entirely by algorithms to more limited improvements and efficiencies in
the workings of corporate bodies and procedures. This article has shown that,
while technology probably has the potential to bring about both changes, the
most significant and immediate impact will fall somewhere in between and
will concern the distribution of powers and competences among corporate
bodies.
Twenty-first century technologies are much more capable than previous
technologies to affect the fundamental determinants along which corporate
law traditionally distributes power between shareholders, directors, and
managers. They reduce collective decision-making costs, speed up and
automate corporate procedures, ensure safer communications and more
accurate reporting, and supplement business competence and skills. These
advantages, collectively considered, may shift the balance on who is, on a
specific matter, the best decision-maker within the corporation.
Shareholders, especially if knowledgeable in business matters, might
come out strengthened from the technological revolution. While it is unlikely
that they will remove directors and managers from their roles, they might
demand greater involvement in business decisions or more direct access to
documents and information for monitoring purposes. The board of directors
might, instead, be strengthened in its monitoring and policy-making
function, while relying somewhat more on shareholders’ indications for
business decisions and on new technologies for advice, recommendations,
and inquiries, to the detriment of external advisors and lower-level managers
and employees.
Although technologically induced changes will likely be firm-specific,
the overall result will likely streamline organizational charts and more so
hybridize corporate roles and functions so that management, monitoring, and
strategy-setting come closer together.296 Many of these changes are, in
practice, enabled by corporate law default provisions that accommodate and
embrace technological change. The DAO constitutes, after all, a remarkable
example of how contract law can adapt technology to business (or, perhaps,
296.

Cf. Fenwick & Vermeulen, supra note 39, at 13.
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make a business out of a technology) and of the risks and challenges that this
entails. The issue then becomes to what extent the law should welcome and
meet these new demands.

